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Abstract
We consider the design of a revenue-optimal mechanism when two items are
available to be sold to a single buyer whose valuation is uniformly distributed
over an arbitrary rectangle [c1, c1+b1]× [c2, c2+b2] in the positive quadrant.
We provide an explicit, complete solution for arbitrary nonnegative values
of (c1, c2, b1, b2). We identify eight simple structures, each with at most 4
(possibly stochastic) menu items, and prove that the optimal mechanism has
one of these eight structures. We also characterize the optimal mechanism
as a function of (c1, c2, b1, b2). The structures indicate that the optimal
mechanism involves (a) an interplay of individual sale and a bundle sale
when c1 and c2 are low, (b) a bundle sale when c1 and c2 are high, and
(c) an individual sale when one of them is high and the other is low. To
the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to show the existence of
optimal mechanisms with no exclusion region. We further conjecture, based
on promising preliminary results, that our methodology can be extended to
a wider class of distributions.
Keywords: Game theory, Economics, Optimal Auctions, Stochastic
Orders, Convex Optimization.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the design of a revenue optimal mechanism for sell-
ing two items. While the solution to the problem of designing an optimal
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: thirumulanathan@gmail.com (D. Thirumulanathan),
rajeshs@iisc.ac.in (Rajesh Sundaresan), narahari@iisc.ac.in (Y Narahari)
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2016, Montreal, Canada [40].
Preprint submitted to Journal of Mathematical Economics March 6, 2019
mechanism for selling a single item is well-known (Myerson [32]), optimal
mechanism design for selling multiple items is a harder problem. Though
there are many partial results available in the literature, finding a general
solution, even in the simplest setting with two heterogeneous items and one
buyer, remains open.
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal mechanism design in
the two-item one-buyer setting, when the valuations of the buyer are uni-
formly distributed in arbitrary rectangles in the positive quadrant. In the
two-item one-buyer setting, Daskalakis et al. [16, 17, 18] considered the most
general class of distributions till date, and gave the optimal solution when
the distribution gives rise to a so-called “well-formed” canonical partition
(to be described in Section 3) of the support set. Giannakopoulos and Kout-
soupias [23] provided closed form solutions when m = 2 and the distribution
of z satisfies some sufficient conditions. The papers [16–18] and [23] rely on
a result of Rochet [37] that transforms the search for an optimal mechanism
into a search for the utility function of the buyer. This function represents
the expected value of the lottery the buyer receives minus the payment to
the seller. The expected payment to the seller is maximized, subject to
the utility function being positive, increasing, convex, and 1-Lipschitz. The
above papers then identify a dual problem, solve it, and exploit this solution
to identify a primal solution. We call this approach the duality approach in
this paper.
The duality approach developed in these papers crucially uses the as-
sumption that the support set D of the distribution is [0, b1] × [0, b2]. We
are aware of only two examples where the support sets [c, c + 1]2, c > 0,
and [4, 16] × [4, 7], for which the exact solutions are known, are not bor-
dered by the coordinate axes. These were considered by Pavlov [36] and
Daskalakis et al. [18], respectively. Daskalakis et al. [16, 17, 18] do consider
other distributions but these distributions must satisfy f(z)(z · n(z)) = 0
on the boundaries of D, where n(z) is the normal to the boundary at z.
The uniform distribution on arbitrary rectangles (which we consider in this
paper) has f(z)(z · n(z)) < 0 in general on the left and bottom boundaries,
and this requires additional nontrivial care in its handling.
1.1. Our contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
(i) We solve the two-item single-buyer optimal mechanism design problem
when z ∼ Unif[c1, c1+b1]×[c2, c2+b2], for arbitrary nonnegative values
of (c1, c2, b1, b2). We compute the exact solution using a nontrivial
extension of the duality approach designed in [18]. The extension
takes care of cases where f(z)(z · n(z)) < 0 on the left and bottom
boundaries.
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Figure 1: An illustration of all possible structures that an optimal mechanism can have.
(ii) We prove that the structure of the optimal solution falls within a class
of eight simple structures, each with at most four menu items2 (see
Figure 1). This is in agreement with the result of Wang and Tang [42].
(iii) To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to show the
existence of optimal mechanisms without an exclusion region, i.e., val-
uations that result in no sale (see Figures 1f and 1h). The results
in Armstrong [1] and Barelli et al. [4] assert that the optimal multi-
dimensional mechanism has an exclusion region, but under some suf-
ficient conditions on the distributions and the utility functions. Arm-
strong [1] assumes that the support set of the distribution of valuations
is strictly convex, and Barelli et al. [4] assume that the utility function
is strictly concave in the allocations. Neither of these assumptions
hold in our setting.
(iv) We also establish another interesting property of the optimal mecha-
nism: given any value of c1, we find a threshold value of c2 beyond
which the mechanism becomes deterministic (see Section 4).
Some qualitative results on the structure of optimal mechanisms were al-
ready known when z’s distribution satisfied certain conditions. For instance,
Pavlov [35] considers distributions with negative power rate3, while Wang
2The phrase “menu items” refers to regions of constant allocation.
3A distribution f is said to have negative power rate when ∆(z1, z2) = −3 −
3
and Tang [42] consider distributions with negative constant power rate. Our
work considers uniform distributions which is a special case of the settings
in both [35] and [42]. So the optimal mechanisms in our setting have alloca-
tions only of the form (0, 0), (a1, 1) and (1, a2), in accordance with Pavlov’s
result, and have at most four menu items, in accordance with Wang and
Tang’s result. In our special case, we are able to prove stronger results. We
show that the optimal mechanisms cannot have a structure other than one
of the eight structures depicted in Figure 1. Our results bring out some
less expected structures like those in Figures 1f and 1h. Beyond qualitative
descriptions, our results enable computation of the optimal mechanism for
the uniform distribution on any arbitrary rectangle.
An alternative approach is to use the results by Wang and Tang [42]
and Pavlov [36] in the following way. First, the optimal mechanism can be
parametrized to have at most four constant allocation regions with allocation
probabilities (0, 0), (a1, 1), (1, a2), and (1, 1), and then the revenue can be
optimized over the allocation and payment variables. The approach appears
to be simpler than the duality approach because it optimizes only over five
variables as opposed to the infinite-dimensional optimization in the duality
approach. We show in Appendix E that this approach leads to non-concave
objective functions whose global optima are generally harder to compute.
We further show that the first order conditions of this optimization problem
are structure-specific. Moreover, transitions between various structures (in
Figure 1, for example) are not captured using this method. See Proposition
6 and the discussions following the proposition in Appendix E. On the other
hand, the duality approach that we use in this paper gives a certificate of
global optimality and captures transitions between various structures.
The optimal mechanism for various values of (c1, c2, b1, b2) are detailed
in Theorems 3-8. The phase diagram in Figure 2 represents how the optimal
mechanism varies when the parameters (c1, c2, b1, b2) vary. We interpret the
results as follows.
• Consider the case when (c1, c2) is low. Then, the seller knows that the
buyer could have very low valuations, and thus sets a high threshold
to sell any item i. Further, he finds it optimal to set the threshold for
the bundle of two items to be less than the sum of the thresholds for
the individual items (see Figure 1a). Thus the case of low valuations
turns out to be an interplay between selling the items individually and
selling the items as a bundle.
• When c1 is low but c2 is high, the seller offers item 2 for the least
z1f
′
1(z1)/f1(z1) − z2f
′
2(z2)/f2(z2) ≤ 0 for every (z1, z2) in the support set of f . It is
said to have negative constant power rate if in addition to being negative, ∆ is also a
constant for every (z1, z2) in the support set of f .
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Figure 2: A phase diagram for the optimal mechanism
valuation c2, but sets a threshold to sell item 1 (see Figure 1f). This is
because the expected revenue gained by exclusion of certain valuations
is always dominated by the revenue lost from them, and thus the seller
finds no reason to withhold item 2 for any valuation profile; see Section
4 for a more precise explanation. A similar case occurs when c2 is low
but c1 is high. In both of these cases, the seller optimizes revenue by
selling the items individually.
• When (c1, c2) is high, the seller sets a threshold close to c1 + c2 to
sell the bundle (see Figure 1d). The threshold converges to the least
possible valuation profile for the bundle, c1+c2, when (c1, c2)→∞. In
this case, the seller optimizes revenue by selling the items as a bundle.
• Starting with (c1, c2) = (0, 0), consider moving the support set rect-
angle to infinity either horizontally or vertically or both. Then, the
optimal mechanism starts as an interplay between individual sale and
bundle sale, and ends up either as a bundle sale or as an individual
sale, based on whether both (c1, c2) are high, or only one of them is
high. All the other structures (Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, and 1g) are
intermediates on the way to the bundle sale or the individual sale
mechanisms.
The wide range of structures that we obtain for various values of (c1, c2)
indicates why support sets that are not bordered by the coordinate axes
require significant analytical effort. In a companion paper [41], we prove that
the structure of optimal mechanism in the two-item unit-demand setting falls
within a class of five simple structures, when z ∼ Unif[c, c+ b1]× [c, c+ b2].
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1.2. Our method
Our method is as follows. From [17] and [18], we know that the dual
problem is an optimal transport problem that transfers mass from the sup-
port set D to itself, subject to the constraint that the difference between
the mass densities transferred out of the set and transferred into the set
convex dominates a signed measure defined by the distribution of the valua-
tions. When (c1, c2) = (0, 0), Daskalakis et al. [16] provided a solution where
the difference between the densities not just convex dominates the signed
measure, but equals it. In another work, Daskalakis et al. [18] provided an
example (z ∼ Unif[4, 16] × [4, 7]) where the difference between the densities
convex dominates but does not equal the signed measure. They construct
a line measure that convex dominates 0, add it to the signed measure, and
then solve the example using the same method that they used to solve the
(c1, c2) = (0, 0) case. They call this line measure as the “shuffling measure”.
Their method can be used to find the optimal solution for more general
distributions, provided we know the structure of the appropriate shuffling
measure that yields the solution. Prior to our work, it was not clear what
shuffling measure would work, even for the restricted setting of uniform
distributions but over arbitrary rectangles. We prove that for the setting
of uniform distributions, the optimal solution is always arrived at by using
shuffling (line) measures of certain specific forms. We do the following.
• We start with the shuffling (line) measure in [18]. We parametrize this
measure using its depth, slope, and the length, and find the relation
between these parameters so that the line measure convex dominates
0.
• We then derive the conditions that these parameters must satisfy in
order to solve the optimal transport problem. The conditions turn out
to be polynomial equations of degree at most 4.
• We identify conditions on the parameters (c1, c2, b1, b2) so that the so-
lutions to the polynomials yield a valid partition of D (allocation prob-
ability is at most 1 and the canonical partition is within D). We thus
arrive at eight different structures. We then prove that the structure
of the optimal mechanism is one of the eight, for any (c1, c2, b1, b2) ≥ 0.
• We then generalize the shuffling measure, and use it to solve an exam-
ple linear density function. This leads us to the conjecture that this
class of shuffling measures will help identify the optimal mechanism
for distributions with negative constant power rate.
Our work thus provides a method to construct an appropriate shuffling
measure, and hence to arrive at the optimal solution, for various distribu-
tions whose support sets are not bordered by the coordinate axes. In our
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view, this is an important step towards understanding optimal mechanisms
in multi-item settings. Furthermore, we feel that the special cases we have
solved could act as guidelines to solve the problem of computing optimal
mechanisms for general distributions or to suggest good menus for practical
settings.
1.3. Prior work
Several works have attempted to provide partial characterizations of op-
timal mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings. Hart and Nisan [26] con-
sidered the case when valuations are correlated, and proved that if the size
of the menu4 is bounded, then there exist joint distributions such that the
revenue obtained from the mechanism is an arbitrarily small fraction of
the optimal revenue. On the other hand, Wang and Tang [42], [39] proved
that the optimal mechanisms have simple structures with at most four menu
items, when the distribution of the buyer’s valuation satisfies a certain power
rate condition (which is satisfied by the uniform distribution). However, the
exact structures and associated allocations were left open. Hart and Reny
[27] provided examples of cases where the buyer’s values for the items in-
crease but the optimal revenue decreases. Haghpanah and Hartline [24] did
a reverse mechanism design; they constructed a mechanism, identified con-
ditions under which there exists a virtual valuation, and thereby established
that the mechanism is optimal.
In the recent literature, more number of explicit solutions have become
available. Manelli and Vincent [29, 30] derived the optimal deterministic
mechanism when the support set of the distribution of buyer’s valuation z is
[0, 1]2. Further, they derived conditions under which the optimal determin-
istic mechanism is also overall optimal. Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias
[22] provided a solution when the number of items m ≤ 6 and the buyer’s
valuations z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∼ Unif[0, 1]m. In another work, Giannakopoulos
[21] considered the case of arbitrary number of items, and proved that when
zi ∼ exp(λ) for all i, and are independent, then bundling maximizes revenue.
Menicucci et al. [31] proved that bundling is optimal when (i) the virtual
valuations are nonnegative for all possible types, and (ii) the distribution
satisfies a certain power rate condition.
In the two-item setting, exact solutions were provided by Daskalakis
et al. [16, 17, 18] and Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias [23] for a rich class
of distributions. Kash and Frongillo [28] identified the dual when the val-
uation space is convex and the space of allocations are restricted. They
also solved examples when the allocations are restricted to satisfy either the
unit-demand constraint or the deterministic constraint.
4The phrase “size of the menu” refers to the number of regions of constant allocation.
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Exact solutions for the setting we consider in this paper have largely
been computed using the duality approach of [17]. Significant exceptions
are the works by Pavlov [34, 35, 36]. Pavlov’s works computed the optimal
solution when z ∼ Unif[c, c+1]2, c > 0, using the virtual valuation approach.
There has also been significant interest in finding approximately opti-
mal solutions when the distribution of the buyer’s valuation satisfies certain
conditions. See [2], [3], [5–12], [14], [15], [19], [20], [25], [43] for relevant
literature on approximate solutions. In this paper, however, our focus shall
be on exact solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate
an optimization problem that describes the two-item single-buyer optimal
mechanism. In Section 3, we revisit the case (solved in [16]) when the left-
bottom corner of the support set is at (0, 0). This is done to set up the
context and notation for the rest of the paper. In Section 4, we discuss the
space of solutions and highlight a few interesting outcomes. In Section 5,
we define the shuffling measures required to find the optimal mechanism for
the uniform distribution on arbitrary rectangles. We prove that the optimal
solution has one of the eight simple structures. In Section 6, we discuss
the conjecture and possible extension to other classes of distributions. In
Section 7, we provide some concluding remarks. In a companion paper [41],
we address the unit-demand setting.
2. Preliminaries
Consider a two-item one-buyer setting. The buyer’s valuation is z =
(z1, z2) for the two items, sampled according to the joint density f(z) =
f1(z1)f2(z2), where f1(z1) and f2(z2) are marginal densities. The support
set of f is defined as D := {z : f(z) > 0}. Throughout this paper, we
restrict attention to an arbitrary rectangle D = [c1, c1 + b1] × [c2, c2 + b2],
where c1, c2, b1, b2 are all nonnegative.
Our aim is to design an optimal mechanism. By the revelation principle
[33, Prop. 9.25], it suffices to focus on direct mechanisms. Further, we
focus on mechanisms where the buyer has a quasilinear utility. Specifically,
we assume an allocation function q : D → [0, 1]2 and a payment function
t : D → R+ that represent, respectively, the probabilities of allocation of the
items to the buyer and the amount that the buyer pays. In other words, for
a reported valuation vector zˆ = (zˆ1, zˆ2), item i is allocated with probability
qi(zˆ), where (q1(zˆ), q2(zˆ)) = q(zˆ), and the seller collects a revenue of t(zˆ)
from the buyer. If the buyer’s true valuation is z, and he reports zˆ, then his
(quasilinear) utility is uˆ(z, zˆ) := z · q(zˆ)− t(zˆ), which is the expected value
of the lottery he receives minus the payment.
A mechanism (q, t) is incentive compatible when truth telling is a weakly
dominant strategy for the buyer, i.e., uˆ(z, z) ≥ uˆ(z, zˆ) for every z, zˆ ∈ D. In
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this case the buyer’s realized utility is
u(z) := uˆ(z, z) = z · q(z)− t(z). (1)
The following result is well known:
Theorem 1. [37] . A mechanism (q, t), with u(z) = z · q(z) − t(z), is
incentive compatible iff u is continuous, convex and ∇u(z) = q(z) for a.e.
z ∈ D.
An incentive compatible mechanism is individually rational if the buyer
is not worse off by participating in the mechanism, i.e., u(z) ≥ 0 for every
z ∈ D, with zero being the buyer’s utility if he chooses not to participate.
An optimal mechanism is one that maximizes the expected revenue to
the seller subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Define a measure µ¯, supported on set D, as follows.
µ¯(A) =
∫
D
1A(z)µ(z) dz +
∫
∂D
1A(z)µs(z) dz + µp(A ∩ (c1, c2))
for all measurable sets A, where the functions µ, µs and µp are defined as
µ(z) := −z · ∇f(z)− 3f(z),
µs(z) :=
{
(z · n(z))f(z) z ∈ ∂D
0 otherwise,
µp(z) := δ(c1,c2)(z).
The vector n(z) denotes the normal to the surface ∂D at z, and the notation
δ in µp(z) denotes the Dirac-delta function. So µp(z) = 1 if z = (c1, c2)
and 0 otherwise. We regard µ as the density of a signed measure that is
absolutely continuous with the two-dimensional Lebesgue measure, and µs
as the density of a signed measure that is absolutely continuous with the one-
dimensional Lebesgue measure. We shall refer to both Lebesgue measures
as dz. Observe that µ¯ is a signed Radon measure on D, and that µ and µs
are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of respective components of µ¯ w.r.t. the
two-dimensional and one-dimensional Lebesgue measures respectively. We
now state the following theorem.
Theorem 2. [18, Thm. 1] The problem of determining the optimal incen-
tive compatible and individually rational mechanism for a single additive
buyer whose values for the goods are distributed according to f : D → R is
equivalent to solving the optimization problem
max
u
∫
D
u dµ¯ (2)
subject to (a)u continuous, convex, increasing,
(b)u(z) − u(z′) ≤ ‖z − z′‖1 ∀z, z′ ∈ D.
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We now recall the definition of the convex ordering relation. A function
f is increasing if z ≥ z′ component-wise implies f(z) ≥ f(z′).
Definition 1. (See for e.g., [18]) Let α and β be measures defined on a set
D. We say α first-order dominates β (α 1 β) if
∫
D f dα ≥
∫
D f dβ for all
continuous and increasing f . We say α convex-dominates β (α cvx β) if∫
D f dα ≥
∫
D f dβ for all continuous, convex and increasing f .
The dual of problem (2) is (see [18, Thm. 2]):
inf
γ
∫
D×D
‖z − z′‖1 dγ(z, z′) (3)
subject to (a) γ ∈ Radon+(D ×D)
(b) γ(·,D) = γ1(·), γ(D, ·) = γ2(·), γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯.
By γ ∈ Radon+(D × D), we mean that γ is an unsigned Radon measure
in D ×D. We derive the weak duality result in Appendix D to provide an
understanding of how the dual arises and why γ may be interpreted as prices
for violating the primal constraint.
The next lemma gives a sufficient condition for strong duality.
Lemma 1. [18, Cor. 1] . Let u∗ and γ∗ be feasible for the aforementioned
primal (2) and dual (3) problems, respectively. Then the objective functions
of (2) and (3) with u = u∗ and γ = γ∗ are equal iff (i)
∫
D u
∗ d(γ∗1 − γ∗2) =∫
D u
∗ dµ¯, and (ii) u∗(z)− u∗(z′) = ‖z − z′‖1, γ∗−a.e.
Remark 1. Condition (i) requires the integrals of the utility function with
respect to (w.r.t.) γ∗1 − γ∗2 and w.r.t. µ¯ be equal. Observe that since u∗ and
γ∗ are feasible for (2) and (3), respectively, the integral w.r.t. γ∗1 − γ∗2 is at
least the integral w.r.t. µ¯. Condition (i) imposes that they are equal.
Remark 2. The constraint of the primal (2) imposes that u∗(z)−u∗(z′) ≤
‖z − z′‖1 for all z, z′ ∈ D. Condition (ii) requires equality for γ∗-almost
every (z, z′).
Our problem now reduces to that of finding a γ such that γ1 − γ2
convex-dominates µ¯ and satisfies the conditions stated in Lemma 1. The
key, nontrivial technical contribution of our paper is to identify such a γ
when z ∼ Unif[c1, c1 + b1]× [c2, c2 + b2], for all (c1, c2, b1, b2) ≥ 0.
3. Revisiting the Case When (c1, c2) = (0, 0)
We first solve the case when z ∼ Unif[0, b1]×[0, b2]. The solution proceeds
exactly according to the general characterization in [18, Sect. 7] that uses
the technique of optimal transport. We provide it here to set up the notation
for the more general case that will follow in later sections. In particular, the
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dual variable γ obtained here and the method to describe it will be used in
later sections. Observe that
(area density) µ(z) = −3/(b1b2), z ∈ D
(line density) µs(z) = (b21{z2 = b2}+ b11{z1 = b1})/(b1b2) z ∈ ∂D
(point measure) µp({0, 0}) = 1. (4)
In other words, µ is the density of a two-dimensional measure with den-
sity −3/(b1b2) everywhere, µs is the density of a one-dimensional measure
of line densities b2/(b1b2) and b1/(b1b2) on the top and right boundaries,
respectively, and µp is a point measure of 1 on (0, 0).
We now enumerate the steps to construct the so-called canonical parti-
tion of the support set D, with respect to µ¯-measure.
(a) Define the outer boundary functions si : [0, bi)→ [0, b−i), i = 1, 2, as
si(zi) := max
{
z∗−i ∈ [0, b−i) :
∫ b−i
z∗
−i
µ(z) dz−i + µs(zi, b−i) = 0
}
.
(5)
Compute the functions s1(z1) for all z1 ∈ [0, b1), and s2(z2) for all
z2 ∈ [0, b2)5.
(b) Construct the exclusion set Z to be the set formed by the intersection
of {(z1, z2) : z2 ≤ s1(z1)}, {(z1, z2) : z1 ≤ s2(z2)}, and {(z1, z2) :
z1 + z2 ≤ p}, where p is chosen such that µ¯(Z) = 06. We call p the
critical price.
(c) Let the point of intersection between the curves {z2 = s1(z1)} and
{z1 + z2 = p} be denoted by P , and the point of intersection between
{z1 = s2(z2)} and {z1 + z2 = p} be denoted by Q. Let P = (P1, P2)
and Q = (Q1, Q2) denote the respective co-ordinates of P and Q. We
call these points P and Q as the critical points. We now partition D\Z
as follows.
• A := ([c1, P1]× [P2, c2 + b2])\Z
• B := ([Q1, c1 + b1]× [c2, Q2])\Z
• W := D\(Z ∪A ∪B).
5The functions si(·) are constructed so that the integrals of the components of µ¯(z1, z2)
over z2 ∈ [s1(z1), b2] equal zero for each z1, and the integrals over [s2(z2), b1] equal zero for
each z2. This enables us to transfer mass from points of excess to those with deficit, and
meet the excess exactly with the deficit. This will soon become clear when we construct
the dual measure γ.
6Again, µ¯(Z) = 0 enables us to transfer mass from points of excess to those with deficit.
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(d) The partition of D into A, B, W and Z, as explained in items (a)-(c),
is termed a canonical partition7.
We now define the allocation and the payment functions (q(z), t(z)),
considering each region of the canonical partition constructed above as a
constant allocation region.
(q1(z), q2(z), t(z)) =


(0, 0, 0) if z ∈ Z
(−s′1(z1), 1, s1(z1)− z1s′1(z1)) if z ∈ A
(1,−s′2(z2), s2(z2)− z2s′2(z2)) if z ∈ B
(1, 1, p) if z ∈W.
(6)
s1(z1)
s 2
(z
2
)
(a)
z
1 +
z
2 =
p
Z
(b)
Z
A
B
WP
Q
(c)
Figure 3: When 1 ≤ b1/b2 ≤ 2, we illustrate (a) the construction of si(zi), (b) the
construction of exclusion set Z such that µ¯(Z) = 0, and (c) the partition of D\Z into A,
B, and W .
We now construct the canonical partition of D using the steps enu-
merated above in (a)-(d), when the valuation z ∼ Unif[0, b1] × [0, b2], with
1 ≤ b1/b2 ≤ 2. The construction is illustrated in Figure 3.
(a) Using the values of µ, µs, and µp in (4) and the formula for outer
boundary functions si(zi) in (5), it is easy to see that s1(z1) = 2b2/3
for every z1 ∈ [0, b1), and s2(z2) = 2b1/3 for every z2 ∈ [0, b2).
(b) We now choose the critical price p so that µ¯(Z) = 0. It is easy to see
that choosing
p =
2(b1 + b2)−
√
2b1b2
3
makes µ¯(Z) = 0.
(c) We now compute the critical points P and Q. They are given by
P = ((2b1 −
√
2b1b2)/3, 2b2/3), Q = (2b1/3, (2b2 −
√
2b1b2)/3).
7The terms outer boundary function, critical price, critical points, and canonical parti-
tion are defined based on [18, Def. 12] and [18, Def. 13].
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But the points P and Q are valid only when they fall within [0, b1]×
[0, b2]. Note that P1 ≥ 0 holds since b1 ≥ b2, and that Q2 ≥ 0 holds
since (2b2 −
√
2b1b2)/3 ≥ 0 whenever b1/b2 ≤ 2. We thus have the
following canonical partition of D\Z, when 1 ≤ b1/b2 ≤ 2:
A = [0, P1]× [2b2/3, b2], B = [2b1/3, b1]× [0, Q2], W = D\(A∪B∪Z).
s1(z1)
s 2
(z
2
)
(a)
z
1 +
z
2 =
pZ
(b)
Z
A
WP
(c)
Figure 4: When b1/b2 > 2, we illustrate (a) the construction of si(zi), (b) the construction
of exclusion set Z such that µ¯(Z) = 0, and (c) the partition of D\Z into A and W .
When b1/b2 = 2, we have Q2 = 0, reducing region B to a null.
When b1/b2 > 2, we construct a canonical partition of D by taking B to
be null. The construction is illustrated in Figure 4.
(a) The outer boundary functions si(zi) remain the same as in the earlier
case.
(b) To construct the exclusion set Z, we need to construct p such that the
µ¯-measure of Z = {(z1, z2) : z2 ≤ 2b2/3, z1 + z2 ≤ p} is zero. It is easy
to derive the critical price p = b1/2 + b2/3.
(c) The critical point P remains the same as in the earlier case. We now
have the following canonical partition of D\Z, when b1/b2 > 2:
A = [0, P1]× [2b2/3, b2], W = D\(A ∪ Z).
Observe that the allocation function turns out to be as depicted in Figure
5a when 1 ≤ b1/b2 ≤ 2, and as in Figure 5b when b1/b2 > 2.
The outer boundary functions si(·) and the critical price p: Re-
call from the characterization results of Pavlov [36] and Wang and Tang [42]
that the optimal mechanism for the uniform distribution has at most four
constant allocation regions, and that the allocations must be of the form
(0, 0), (a1, 1), and (1, a2). From the expressions of (q, t) in (6), the outer
boundary function s1 determines the price of the allocation (a1, 1), and its
slope determines the value of a1. Similarly, the outer boundary function s2
determines the price of allocation (1, a2), and its slope determines the value
of a2. The critical price p used to construct the exclusion set Z determines
the price of the allocation (1, 1). Thus all the five parameters in the optimal
mechanism – two allocation parameters and three price parameters – are
determined by the outer boundary functions s1, s2, and the critical price p.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: The optimal mechanism for the case z ∼ Unif[0, b1] × [0, b2], when (a) 1 ≤
b1/b2 ≤ 2 and (b) b1/b2 ≥ 2.
We now proceed to prove that our constructions are indeed the optimal
mechanisms.
Proposition 1. Consider z ∼ Unif [0, b1] × [0, b2] and suppose that b1 ≥
b2 > 0. Then the optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 5a when
1 ≤ b1/b2 ≤ 2, and is as depicted in Figure 5b when b1/b2 ≥ 2.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we must find a feasible u and a feasible γ, and
show that they satisfy the constraints of Lemma 1. We define u through the
allocation function q defined in (6) and the relation ∇u = q.
We now proceed to find the dual variable γ. We first partition W =
D\(Z ∪A ∪B) into three regions:
W1 : [P1, b1)× [s1(z1), b2], W2 : [s2(z2), b1]× [Q2, s1(z1)],
W3 : the remaining region
when the mechanism is as in Figure 5a, and the same three regions but
replacing Q2 by 0, when the mechanism is as in Figure 5b. Observe that
W3 contains a portion of the right boundary adjacent to W1. We define
the set ∂D+ to be the set of points in top and right boundaries of D, i.e.,
∂D+ := {z : (z1, z2) ∈ D : z1 = b1 or z2 = b2}.
We now set up the dual variable γ measure as follows. First, let γ1 :=
γZ1 +γ
D\Z
1 , with γ
Z
1 = µ¯
Z , the µ¯ measure restricted to Z, and γ
D\Z
1 = µ¯
D\Z
+ .
So γ1 is supported on (∂D
+ ∪ Z). Next we specify the transition kernel
γ(· | z) for z ∈ (∂D+ ∪ Z).
(a) For z ∈ Z, we define γ(· | z) = δz(·). We interpret this as the mass
being retained at each z ∈ Z.
(b) For z ∈ (A∪W1)∩∂D+, γ(· | z) is defined by the uniform probability
density on the line {z1}× [s1(z1), b2), and zero elsewhere. We interpret
this as a transfer of µs(z) from the boundary to the above line.
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(c) For z ∈ (B ∪W2)∩ ∂D+, γ(· | z) is defined by the uniform probability
density on the line [s2(z2), b1) × {z2}, and zero elsewhere. Again, we
interpret this as a transfer of µs(z) from the boundary to the above
line.
(d) For z ∈ W3 ∩ ∂D+, γ(· | z) is defined as follows. The total mass
µs(W3∩∂D+) is spread uniformly onW3\∂D+ with equal contribution
from each z in W3∩∂D+. (Note that W3∩∂D+ is non-empty; see the
right boundary in Figures 5a and 5b.)
We then define γ(F ) =
∫
(z,z′)∈F γ1(dz)γ(dz
′ | z) for any measurable
F ∈ D × D. It is then easy to check, by virtue of the choices of s1(z1),
s2(z2), Z, and the matchings in (a)–(d), that γ
Z
2 = γ(Z, ·) = µ¯Z , and
γ
D\Z
2 = γ(D\Z, ·) = µ¯D\Z− . Thus (γ1 − γ2)Z = 0 and (γ1 − γ2)D\Z = µ¯D\Z .
We now verify if γ is feasible. To prove γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯, it suffices to
show that (i) (γ1− γ2)Z cvx µ¯Z , and (ii) (γ1− γ2)D\Z cvx µ¯D\Z . Part (ii)
holds trivially. We now show that 0 cvx µ¯Z . Observe that the components
of µ¯Z are positive only at (c1, c2), the left-bottom corner, and are negative
elsewhere. Further, we have µ¯+(Z) = µ¯−(Z) = 1, since the exclusion set Z
was constructed to have µ¯(Z) = 0. So for any increasing function f , we have∫
Z f(z) dµ¯
Z ≤ 0. This proves that 0 cvx µ¯Z , and also that γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯.
We now verify condition (i) in Lemma 1.∫
D
u d(γ1 − γ2) =
∫
Z
u d(γ1 − γ2)Z +
∫
D\Z
u d(γ1 − γ2)D\Z
=
∫
D\Z
u dµ¯ =
∫
D
u dµ¯
where the second and the last equalities follow because u(z) = 0 when z ∈ Z.
We now verify condition (ii) in Lemma 1. To see why u(z) − u(z′) =
‖z − z′‖1 holds γ-a.e., it suffices to check this for those z on (∂D+ ∪ Z)
and the corresponding z′ for which γ(· | z) is nonzero, as in the four cases
(a)–(d) above. For z, z′ in (a), u(z) − u(z′) = 0. In (b), u(z) − u(z′) =
z2 − z′2 = ‖z − z′‖1. In (c), u(z) − u(z′) = z1 − z′1 = ‖z − z′‖1. In (d),
u(z)−u(z′) = (z1−z′1)+(z2−z′2) = ‖z−z′‖1. Thus u(z)−u(z′) = ‖z−z′‖1
holds γ-a.e.
In this example, the dual variable γ was constructed so that (γ1 −
γ2)
D\Z = µ¯D\Z . In the more general case to be considered in the rest
of the paper, we must shuffle the mass µ¯+ α¯ (in place of µ¯), for some α¯ that
convex-dominates the zero measure. So the dual variable γ will be such that
(γ1 − γ2)D\Z = µ¯D\Z + α¯.
4. A Discussion of Optimal Solutions for the General Case
We now discuss the space of solutions for any nonnegative c1, c2, b1, b2.
The main result of this paper is that the optimal mechanism is given as
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follows. For a summarizing phase diagram, see Figure 2. To see a portrayal
of all eight structures, see Figure 1.
4.1. Optimal solutions
We describe the optimal solutions via decision trees. In Section 4.2, we
provide a discussion on the solutions. The formal statements are in Section
5.
4.1.1. c1b1 and
c2
b2
small
When the values of c1b1 and
c2
b2
are small, in the sense that
{c1 ≤ b1, c2 ≤ 2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1)}
∪ {c2 ≤ b2, c1 ≤ 2b1(b2 + c2)/(b2 + 3c2)} , (7)
the optimal mechanism has one of the four structures in Figure 6. Defining
p∗ai :=
2b−i − c−i
3
− 4ci
9
+
2
9
√
2ci(2ci + 3(b−i + c−i)),
ri :=
2b−i(2bi + 5ci)− c−i(2bi − 3ci)
3(2bi + 3ci)
,
the exact structure is given as follows.
(a) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6a, if there exists pai ∈ [ri, p∗ai ],
i = 1, 2, solving the following two equations simultaneously:
(c1 − c2 − 2(b1 − b2)− (pa1 − pa2))(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)
+ 8c1(b2− pa1)(c1− 2b1+3pa2)− 8c2(b1− pa2)(c2− 2b2+3pa1) = 0,
(8)
3
2∏
i=1
(bi(c−i − 2b−i + 3pai)− 4ci(b−i − pai))
−
2∑
i=1
((bi(c−i−2b−i+3pai)−4ci(b−i−pai))(ci−2bi+3pa−i)(c−i+b−i))
− 3
8
2∏
i=1
((2b−i − c−i − pai)(ci − 2bi + 3pa−i)− 4c−i(bi − pa−i)) = 0.
(9)
(b) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6b, if (i) the condition in
(a) does not hold, and (ii) there exists pa1 ∈ [r1, p∗a1 ] that solves the
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following equation:
− 8c1b22 + (c2b1 − b2b1 − b2c1)(c2 − 2b2)
+ (c2/2− b1) (c2 − 2b2)2 − (3/8)(c2 − 2b2)3
+
(
c1(4c2 − 3b2) + 3b1b2 + 2(c2 − 2c1)(c2 − 2b2)− 15/8(c2 − 2b2)2
)
pa1
+ (3c2/2− 21/8(c2 − 2b2)) p2a1 − (9/8)p3a1 = 0. (10)
(c) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6c, if (i) the conditions in (a)-
(b) do not hold, and (ii) there exists pa2 ∈ [r2, p∗a2 ] that solves the
following equation:
− 8c2b21 + (c1b2 − b2b1 − b1c2)(c1 − 2b1)
+ (c1/2− b2) (c1 − 2b1)2 − (3/8)(c1 − 2b1)3
+
(
c2(4c1 − 3b1) + 3b1b2 + 2(c1 − 2c2)(c1 − 2b1)− 15/8(c1 − 2b1)2
)
pa2
+ (3c1/2− 21/8(c1 − 2b1)) p2a2 − (9/8)p3a2 = 0. (11)
(d) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6d, if the conditions in (a)–(c)
do not hold.
The decision tree in Figure 7 summarizes the procedure to find the exact
structure. We discuss this in detail in Section 5.1. The results are formally
stated in Theorem 3 of that section.
4.1.2. c1b1 is small but
c2
b2
is large
When the value of c2b2 is large but
c1
b1
is small, in the sense that
{
c1 ≤ b1, c2 ∈ [2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2]
}
, (12)
the optimal mechanism has one of the two structures depicted in Figure 8.
The exact structures are given as follows.
(a) The optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 8a, if there exists
(pa1 ∈ [(2b2− c2)+, b2], a1 ≤ 1) that solves the following two equations
simultaneously:
a1 = pa1
(
3
2pa1 + c2
b1b2 − c1pa1
)
; a1 =
pa1
b1 − c1
√
2(pa1 + c2)
b2
. (13)
(b) The optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 8b, if conditions in
(a) fail.
The decision tree in Figure 9 summarizes the procedure to find the exact
structure. We discuss this in detail in Section 5.2. The results are formally
stated in Theorem 4 of that section.
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Figure 6: When c1, c2, b1, b2 fall in the shaded region on the left side, the optimal mech-
anism has one of the four structures described on the right side. q1, q2 in each structure
indicate the corresponding allocation probabilities.
4.1.3. c1b1 is small but
c2
b2
is very large
When the value of c2b2 is very large but
c1
b1
is small, in the sense that{
c1 ≤ b1, c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2
}
,
the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 10. We discuss this in detail in Section
5.2. The result is formally stated in Theorem 5 of that section.
4.1.4. c2b2 is small but
c1
b1
is large
When the value of c1b1 is large but
c2
b2
is small, in the sense that{
c2 ≤ b2, c1 ∈ [2b1(b2 + c2)/(b2 + 3c2), 2b1(b2/(b2 − c2))2]
}
,
the optimal mechanism has the structure as depicted either in Figure 11a,
or in Figure 11b. Notice that this is the symmetric counterpart of the
case where c2b2 is large but
c1
b1
is small. The exact structures are symmetric
counterparts of Figures 8a and 8b. See Theorem 6 of Section 5.3.
4.1.5. c2b2 is small but
c1
b1
is very large
When the value of c1b1 is very large but
c2
b2
is small, in the sense that{
c2 ≤ b2, c1 ≥ 2b1(b2/(b2 − c2))2
}
,
the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 11c. See Theorem 7 of Section 5.3.
18
The case when (c1, c2, b1, b2) satisfy (7)
Does ∃pai ∈ [ri, p∗ai ]
solving (8) and (9)?
Yes Fig. 6a is
optimal
No
Does ∃pa1 ∈ [r1, p∗a1 ]
solving (10)?
Yes Fig. 6b is
optimal
No
Does ∃pa2 ∈ [r2, p∗a2 ]
solving (11)?
Yes Fig. 6c is
optimal
No
Fig. 6d is
optimal
Figure 7: Decision tree illustrating the structure of optimal mechanism when c1, c2, b1, b2
fall in the shaded region in Figure 6, i.e., when c1
b1
and c2
b2
are small.
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Figure 8: When c1, c2, b1, b2 fall in the shaded region on the left side, the optimal mecha-
nism has one of the two structures described on the right side.
4.1.6. c1b1 and
c2
b2
large
In the remaining cases when c1b1 and
c2
b2
are large, in the sense that
{c1 ≥ b1, c2 ≥ b2} ,
the optimal mechanism is given by pure bundling as in Figure 12.
Figure 2 provides a self-explanatory ‘phase diagram’ of optimal mecha-
nisms as a function of c1b1 and
c2
b2
. Interesting cases occur when either c1 ≤ b1
or c2 ≤ b2. See Theorem 8 of Section 5.4.
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The case when (c1, c2, b1, b2) satisfy (12)
Does ∃pa1 ∈ [(2b2 − c2)+, b2]
and a1 ≤ 1 solving (13)?
Yes
Fig. 8a is
optimal
No
Fig. 8b is
optimal
Figure 9: Decision tree illustrating the structure of optimal mechanism when c1, c2, b1, b2
fall in the shaded region in Figure 8, i.e., when c1
b1
is small and c2
b2
is large.
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Figure 10: When c1, c2, b1, b2 fall in the shaded region on the left side, the optimal mech-
anism has the structure described on the right side.
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Figure 11: The structures of the optimal mechanism when c2
b2
is small and c1
b1
is large.
4.2. Discussion
Further refinements. Observe that some of the regions in the phase dia-
gram are not completely partitioned to map each figure to its corresponding
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Figure 12: When c1, c2, b1, b2 fall in the shaded region on the left side, the optimal mech-
anism has the structure described on the right side.
region of optimality. For example, consider the region when (c1, c2, b1, b2)
satisfies (7). The phase diagram does not indicate the sub-region where 6a
is optimal. This is because the explicit map is not only dependent on the
ratios c1/b1 and c2/b2, but also on the individual values of (c1, c2, b1, b2).
We illustrate this dependence in Figure 13. We consider three exam-
ples of (b1, b2), numerically compute the optimal mechanisms, and provide
a complete partition of the c1b1 ,
c2
b2
space. Observe that in each example, the
region of optimality for the structures is different. However, the mechanisms
are scale-invariant, and thus we can fix b2 = 1, without loss of generality.
These examples also prove the ‘existence result’, i.e., for each of these eight
structures, there exists some (c1, c2, b1, b2) for which that structure is opti-
mal.
Four menu items. Recall from footnote 2 that the power rate ∆ : D → R
is
∆(z1, z2) := −3− z1f
′
1(z1)
f1(z1)
− z2f
′
2(z2)
f2(z2)
.
Wang and Tang [42] proved that the optimal mechanism for a distribution
with ∆ equaling a negative constant, has at most four menu items. The
uniform distribution has power rate −3 for all z ∈ D, and it is easy to verify
that in each of the structures in Figure 1, the number of menu items is at
most four, in agreement with the result in [42].
Revenue monotonicity. Not all structures with four menu items are
possible. We now elaborate on this. Hart and Reny [27] showed that, in
general, the optimal mechanism may have z ≥ z′ ; t(z) ≥ t(z′), i.e., the
optimal revenue could decrease despite an increase in the buyer’s valuations
for both the items. Consider the hypothetical structures depicted in Figure
14. Each has four menu items in accordance with [42]. But there exist z
and z′ with z ≥ z′ and yet t(z) < t(z′), if the prices for the allocations
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 13: The optimal mechanisms when (a) b1 = 0.6; b2 = 1 (b) b1 = 1.5; b2 = 1 (c)
b1 = 1; b2 = 1.
(a1, 1) and (1, a2) are different. From our results in this paper, in the case of
uniformly distributed valuations, the optimal mechanisms are as in Figure
1 and satisfy z ≥ z′ ⇒ q(z) ≥ q(z′) and thus z ≥ z′ ⇒ t(z) ≥ t(z′) which is
revenue monotonicity. In particular, the hypothetical structures in Figure
14 cannot occur.
No exclusion region. When c1b1 is small and
c2
b2
is very large, in the sense
that {c1 ≤ b1, c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2}, we show (in Theorem 5) that the
optimal mechanism is to sell according to the menu depicted in Figure 10,
i.e., to sell the second item with probability 1 for the least valuation c2, and
sell item 1 at a reserve price as indicated by Myerson’s revenue maximizing
mechanism. Similar is the case when c2b2 is small and
c1
b1
is very large.
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(0, 0)
(1, a2)
(a1, 1)
(1, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, a2)
(a1, 1)
(1, 1)
(1, a2)
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
Figure 14: An illustration of the structures having at most four menu items and not
satisfying the condition z ≥ z′ ⇒ t(z) ≥ t(z′).
This is interesting because it shows the existence of an optimal multi-
dimensional mechanism without an exclusion region. An intuitive explana-
tion of why we do not have an exclusion region in Figure 10 is as follows.
Consider the case where the seller offers each allocation with a small in-
crease in price, say ǫ. The seller then loses a revenue of c2 from the valu-
ations {z : u(z) ≤ ǫ}, and gains an extra revenue of ǫ from the valuations
{z : u(z) ≥ ǫ}. The mechanism will have no exclusion region when the loss
dominates the gain. For small values of ǫ, observe that the expected loss in
revenue is
c2·Pr({z : u(z) ≤ ǫ}) = c2 ǫ(b1 − c1)/2
b1b2
+((c1+b1)/2+c2)
ǫ2
2
≈ c2 ǫ(b1 − c1)/2
b1b2
,
and that the expected gain in revenue is
ǫ · Pr({z : u(z) ≥ ǫ}) = ǫ · (1− Pr({z : u(z) ≤ ǫ})) ≈ ǫ.
The loss dominates the gain when c2 ≥ 2b2 b1b1−c1 . (The actual threshold
will depend on more precise calculations than our order estimates.) Both
the loss and the gain are of the order of ǫ, which explains the possibility of
loss dominating gain at very high values of c2. Figure 11c has no exclusion
region due to a symmetric reasoning.
Deterministic sale. When both c1b1 and
c2
b2
are large, {c1 ≥ b1, c2 ≥
b2}, the optimal mechanism is to bundle the two items and sell the bun-
dle at the reserve price. The reserve price c1 + c2 + p is such that p =(√
(c1 + c2)2 + 6b1b2 − c1 − c2
)
/3. So as c1 + c2 →∞, the reserve price is
c1 + c2 + O(b1b2/(c1 + c2)). When c1 < b1, the mechanism is deterministic
for any c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1− c1))2, and when c1 ≥ b1, it is deterministic for any
c2 ≥ b2.
5. The Solution for the Uniform Density on a Rectangle
In this section, we formally identify the optimal mechanism when z ∼
Unif[c1, c1 + b1] × [c2, c2 + b2]. We compute the components of µ¯ (i.e.,
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µ, µs, µp), with f(z) =
1
b1b2
for z ∈ D = [c1, c1 + b1] × [c2, c2 + b2], are
as follows:
(area density) µ(z) = −3/(b1b2), z ∈ D
(line density) µs(z) =
2∑
i=1
(−ci1(zi = ci) + (ci + bi)1(zi = ci + bi))/(b1b2),
z ∈ ∂D
(point measure) µp({c1, c2}) = 1.
To construct the canonical partition of D, we first need to compute
the outer boundary functions si(·). When ci > 0, we have µs(ci, z−i) =
−ci/(b1b2) < 0 for all z−i. A natural extension of the definition of si(zi) in
(5) to accommodate the line density µs at zi = ci is to write
si(ci) = max {z−i ∈ [c−i, c−i + b−i) :∫ c−i+b−i
z∗
−i
µs(ci, z−i) dz−i + µp(ci, c−i + b−i) = 0
}
.
However, this is inadequate since µs(ci, z−i) < 0 for all z−i and µp(ci, c−i +
b−i) = 0, and the integral that goes to define si(ci) never equals 0. So
the method of construction of canonical partition explained in Section 3,
especially that of computing the outer boundary functions si at zi = ci,
cannot be used. The construction method needs an extension. Specifically,
when (c1, c2) 6= (0, 0), we need to shuffle µ¯ so that the function si is defined
everywhere in [ci, ci+ bi). We add to µ¯ a “shuffling measure” α¯ that convex
dominates 0. We then find si(zi) using µ¯+ α¯, instead of µ¯.
We now investigate the possible structure of such a shuffling measure.
We know (from [36]) that the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6a when
z ∼ Unif[c, c+1]2, c ≤ 0.077, and also that a1 = a2 = 0 when z ∼ Unif[0, 1]2.
In other words, the outer boundary functions si(zi) are constant when c = 0,
and linear when c ∈ (0, 0.077]. Thus we anticipate that adding a shuffling
measure whose density is linear on the top-left and bottom-right boundaries,
with point measures at the top-left and bottom-right corners to neutralize
the negative line densities at zi = ci, would yield the solution.
Daskalakis et al. [18] identify such a shuffling measure when they solve
for D = [4, 16] × [4, 7]. In this paper, we identify shuffling measures for all
rectangles D on the positive quadrant. Specifically, we do the following.
(i) We suitably parametrize the shuffling measure α¯, and find the condi-
tions on the parameters for α¯ cvx 0 to hold.
• The shuffling measure is defined using six parameters: (pa1 , a1,m1)
and (pa2 , a2,m2). The parameters (pa1 , a1,m1) are respectively
the functions of the start point, the slope, and the length of the
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line segment P ′P when projected on to the x-axis; see Figure 15.
The description of (pa2 , a2,m2) is similar, and m2 is the length
of the line segment QQ′ when projected on to the y-axis. See
Figure 15.
• Using the conditions for α¯ cvx 0, we write (ai,mi) in terms of
pai . We then have only two parameters, pa1 and pa2 , to evaluate.
(ii) We then identify the canonical partition with respect to µ¯ + α¯. The
outer boundary functions si(·), the critical price p, and the critical
points P andQ, are expressed in terms of pa1 and pa2 . We use a slightly
modified procedure to identify the canonical partition (as explained
below), instead of the procedure described in Section 3.
• We first compute the outer boundary functions si(·) using the
components of µ¯ + α¯, exactly as enumerated in bullet (a), in
Section 3.
• We then compute the critical points P and Q before computing
the parameter p. This is because the critical points can be fixed
using the parameters m1 andm2 computed in the previous bullet.
• We then compute the critical price p which must be such that,
in addition to satisfying µ¯(Z) = 0, the critical points P and Q in
Figure 15 must be connected by a 135◦ line.
• We finally compute pa1 and pa2 that simultaneously solve the
polynomials that arise out of the two constraints.
(iii) Then, for each rectangle D, we identify the parameters of α¯ so that
the canonical partition becomes a valid partition. The dual variable
is then computed as in the proof of Proposition 1.
• The parameters thus computed need not give rise to a valid par-
tition for all (c1, c2, b1, b2) ≥ 0. Specifically, the probability of
allocation, ai, could be more than 1 or the critical points P and
Q could be outside D. Recall from Section 3 that the point Q
fell outside D when b1/b2 > 2, during our initial analysis.
• In Sections 5.1.1–5.1.4, we consider the case when (ci, bi) satisfies
(7). We show that the optimal mechanism is one of the four
structures in Figure 6a – 6d, depending on ai ≤ 1 or ai > 1,
i = 1, 2.
• In Section 5.2, we consider the case when c1b1 is large and
c2
b2
is
small. We show that the critical point P moves below the bottom
boundary of D if we continue to use α¯ as the shuffling measure.
We therefore switch to β¯, a variant of α¯. Using similar arguments
as in Section 5.1, we show that the optimal mechanism is one of
the three structures in Figures 8 and 10. A symmetric argument
is employed in Section 5.3.
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Figure 15: An illustration of the parameters in the shuffling measure α¯.
• In Section 5.4, we consider the case when both c1b1 and
c2
b2
are large.
We prove that pure bundling is optimal, using some sufficient
conditions derived in the earlier sections.
We now fill in the details. We begin by describing the shuffling measure α¯.
5.1. Optimal mechanisms when c1b1 and
c2
b2
are small
For m1 > 0, define D˜
(1) : [c1, c1 + b1]× {c2 + b2}, an interval on the top
boundary of D starting from the top-left corner. For a1, pa1 > 0, define a
linear function α
(1)
s : D˜(1) → R, given by
α(1)s (x, c2 + b2) := (2b2 − c2 − 3pa1 +3a1(x− c1))/(b1b2), x ∈ [c1, c1 +m1].
(14)
Define α
(1)
p := c1(b2− pa1)/(b1b2)δ(c1,c2+b2), a point measure of mass c1(b2−
pa1)/(b1b2) at location (c1, c2 + b2). Finally, define the measure
α¯(1)(A) :=
∫ c1+m1
c1
1A(x, c2 + b2)α
(1)
s (x, c2 + b2) dx+ α
(1)
p (A ∩ (c1, c2 + b2))
for all measurable sets A ⊆ D˜(1). See Figure 16.
Observe that the measure α¯(1) is characterized by three parameters: pa1 ,
a1, m1. As the discussion proceeds, we will observe that these parameters
determine respectively the price of the allocation (a1, 1), the probability
of allocation of the first good a1, and the point of transition between the
allocation regions (a1, 1) and (1, 1).
We now discuss a property of measures that convex dominates zero. All
proofs of assertions in this subsection are relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Consider a measure α defined in the interval [c1, c1 +m1],
whose density is nonnegative in the intervals [c1, c1+l1] and [c1+l2, c1+m1],
and is nonpositive in the interval [c1 + l1, c1 + l2], for some l1 < l2. If
α([c1, c1 +m1]) =
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
xα(dx) = 0, then α cvx 0.
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α¯(1)(x)
x
c1(b2 − pa1)
2b2 − c2 − 3pa1
2b2 − c2 − 3pa1 + 3a1m1
c1 c1 + 2m1/3 c1 +m1
Figure 16: The measure α¯(1).
Corollary 1. Suppose m1 =
4c1(b2−pa1)
c2−2b2+3pa1 and a1 =
(c2−2b2+3pa1)2
8c1(b2−pa1) . Then,
α¯(1)(D˜(1)) =
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
x α¯(1)(dx, c2 + b2) = 0, and hence
∫
D˜(1) f dα¯
(1) = 0
for any affine function f on D˜(1). Furthermore, α¯(1) cvx 0.
We now define a similar interval D˜(2) := {c1 + b1} × [c2 +m2] for some
m2 > 0 on the right boundary of D, starting from the bottom-right corner.
For a2, pa2 > 0, we define a similar line measure α
(2)
s at the interval D˜(2), a
point measure α
(2)
p at (c1 + b1, c2), and
α¯(2)(A) :=
∫ c2+m2
c2
1A(c1 + b1, x)α
(2)
s (c1 + b1, x) dx+ α
(2)
p (A ∩ (c1 + b1, c2)).
As we will later see, the parameters pa2 , a2, and m2 that characterize α¯
(2)
will respectively determine the price of allocation (1, a2), the probability a2,
and the point of transition between (1, a2) and (1, 1). Define α¯ := α¯
(1)+ α¯(2)
on D.
We now identify the canonical partition of D with respect to µ¯+ α¯, using
the steps enumerated in bullet (ii), Section 5. The construction is illustrated
in Figure 17.
(a) The outer boundary functions si(·) with respect to µ¯+α¯ are computed
using the following expressions that are similar to (5).
si(zi) = max
{
z−i ∈ [c−i, c−i + b−i) :
∫ c−i+b−i
z∗
−i
µ(ci, z−i) dz−i
+(µs + α
(i)
s )(ci, c−i + b−i) = 0
}
, ∀zi ∈ (ci, ci + bi),
si(ci) = max {z−i ∈ [c−i, c−i + b−i) :∫ c−i+b−i
z∗
−i
µs(ci, z−i) dz−i + α(i)p (ci, c−i + b−i) = 0
}
.
(15)
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s1(z1)
s 2
(z
2
)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
(c1 + pa2 , c2)
(c
1
,
c
2
+
p
a
1
)
(a)
P
Q
P = (c1 + m1, s1(c1 + m1))
Q = (s2(c2 + m2), c2 + m2)
(b)
Z
A
B
W
z1 + z2
= c1 + c2 + p
P
Q
P = (c1 + m1, s1(c1 + m1))
Q = (s2(c2 + m2), c2 + m2)
(c)
Figure 17: An illustration of (a) the construction of si(zi) (b) the computation of P and
Q and (c) the construction of exclusion set and the canonical partition.
Observe that the components of µ¯ in (5) have been replaced by the
components of (µ¯+ α¯) in the above equations. The values of si(·) are
given by
si(zi) =
{
c−i + pai − ai(zi − ci), ci ≤ zi ≤ ci +mi
2
3(c−i + b−i), ci +mi < zi ≤ ci + bi.
Observe that si is discontinuous at zi = ci +mi. The values of ai and
mi are as given in the statement of Corollary 1. They are also given
below.
a1 =
(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)2
8c1(b2 − pa1)
, a2 =
(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)2
8c2(b1 − pa2)
, (16)
m1 =
4c1(b2 − pa1)
c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1
, m2 =
4c2(b1 − pa2)
c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2
.
(b) The critical points P and Q are given by P = (c1 +m1, s1(c1 +m1)),
and Q = (s2(c2+m2), c2+m2). Substituting the values of si(ci+mi),
ai, and mi from the previous bullet, we have
P = (c1 + 4c1(b2 − pa1)/(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1), c2 + (2b2 − c2 − pa1)/2) ,
Q = (c1 + (2b1 − c1 − pa2)/2, c2 + 4c2(b1 − pa2)/(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)) .
(17)
(c) We now choose the critical price p so that (i) µ¯(Z) = 0, and (ii) the
critical points P and Q lie on the line z1 + z2 = c1 + c2 + p. The
latter constraint holds when P1 + P2 = Q1 + Q2 holds. Substituting
the expressions for P and Q (from (17)) and simplifying, we have
(c1 − c2 − 2(b1 − b2)− (pa1 − pa2))(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)
+ 8c1(b2− pa1)(c1− 2b1+3pa2)− 8c2(b1− pa2)(c2− 2b2+3pa1) = 0.
(18)
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The constraint µ¯(Z) = 0 is the same as µ¯(W ) = 0, since (i) the regions
A and B have been constructed to satisfy µ¯(A) = µ¯(B) = 0, and (ii)
it is easy to verify that µ¯(D) = 0. From an examination of Figure 6a
and simple geometry considerations, it is immediate that −µ¯(W ) = 0
iff
3(b1 − (P1 − c1))(b2 − (Q2 − c2))− 3
2
(P2 −Q2)(Q1 − P1)
− (c2 + b2)(b1 − (P1 − c1))− (c1 + b1)(b2 − (Q2 − c2)) = 0.
This upon substitution of the expressions for P and Q yields
3
2∏
i=1
(bi(c−i − 2b−i + 3pai)− 4ci(b−i − pai))
−
2∑
i=1
((bi(c−i−2b−i+3pai)−4ci(b−i−pai))(ci−2bi+3pa−i)(c−i+b−i))
− (3/8)
2∏
i=1
((2b−i− c−i−pai)(ci−2bi+3pa−i)−4c−i(bi−pa−i)) = 0.
(19)
The values of (pa1 , pa2) are computed by solving (18) and (19) si-
multaneously. Note that these equations are the same as (8) and
(9) respectively. The critical price p can then be computed from
P1 + P2 = Q1 +Q2 = c1 + c2 + p, from which we derive p as
p =
4c1(b2 − pa1)
c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1
+
2b2 − c2 − pa1
2
=
2b1 − c1 − pa2
2
+
4c2(b1 − pa2)
c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2
.
(20)
(d) We thus have the following canonical partition of D.
Z = {(z1, z2) : z2 ≤ s1(z1)} ∩ {(z1, z2) : z1 ≤ s2(z2)}
∩ {(z1, z2) : z1 + z2 ≤ c1 + c2 + p},
A = ([c1, P1]× [s1(z1), c2 + b2])\Z,
B = ([s2(z2), c1 + b1]× [c2, Q2])\Z,
W = D\(A ∪B ∪ Z).
The allocation and the payment functions (q(z), t(z)) are given by (6).
We now verify if the values of (pa1 , pa2) that solve (18) and (19) simul-
taneously, give rise to a valid partition. The partition is valid, if (pa1 , pa2)
are such that (i) pai ∈ [0, b−i], (ii) ai ∈ [0, 1], (iii) the critical points P and
Q lie in D, and (iv) P lies to the north-west of Q.
To prove the validity of the partition, we do the following.
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• We first analyze how the values of ai and the points P and Q vary
when pai varies.
• We then compute ri such that the critical points coincide when we fix
pai = ri. This constitutes a start point for our exploration. We also
compute p∗ai such that ai = 1 when we fix pai = p
∗
ai . This constitutes
the end point for our exploration.
• Start at pai = ri. Move the values of pa1 and pa2 in such a way that
P1 + P2 = Q1 +Q2 holds, and stop either when pai = p
∗
ai for some i,
or when µ¯(W ) = 0. We consider four cases based on whether ri ≤ p∗ai
or not.
• A case-by-case analysis will then establish that the optimal mechanism
falls within one of the four structures depicted in Figure 6, when ci, bi
satisfy (7).
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
pa2
pa1
P
Q
s1(z1)
s2(z2)
ai = s
′
i
(a)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
pa2
pa1
p′a2
p′a1
P
QP ′
Q′
ai increases
(b)
Figure 18: (a) An illustration of observation 1 – the values of pai determine the partition
of the type space. (b) An illustration of observation 2 – an increase in pai to p
′
ai
increases
ai, and also moves the critical points towards south-west.
We begin with the following observations.
Observation 1. The value of pa1 determines the value of a1, the critical
point P , and the outer boundary function s1(z1). Similarly, the value of
pa2 determines the value of a2, the critical point Q, and the outer boundary
function s2(z2). This can be observed from (16) and (17). See the illustration
in Figure 18a.
So if pai are fixed such that P1+P2 = Q1+Q2, then the partition of the
type space is also fixed.
Observation 2. Assume pai ∈ [(2b−i − c−i)/3, b−i]. Then, an increase in
pa1 increases a1, and moves P towards south-west (i.e., decreases both P1
and P2). Similarly, an increase in pa2 increases a2, and moves Q towards
south-west. See the illustration in Figure 18b.
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We now define p∗ai :=
2b−i−c−i
3 − 4ci9 + 29
√
2ci(2ci + 3(b−i + c−i)) and
ri :=
2b−i(2bi+5ci)−c−i(2bi−3ci)
3(2bi+3ci)
. Observe that ai = 1 when pai = p
∗
ai , and that
p∗ai ∈ [(2b−i − c−i)/3, b−i]. We consider four cases based on the values of ri
and p∗ai .
5.1.1. Case 1: ri ≤ p∗ai , i = 1, 2
In this case, we have ai ≤ 1 at pai = ri. We now make a series of claims,
proofs of which are in Appendix A.
1. When ci, bi satisfy (7), then ri ∈ [(2b−i − c−i)/3, b−i], i = 1, 2. When
pai = ri, we have P = Q, i.e., the critical points P and Q coincide.
Moreover, µ¯(W ) ≥ 0.
2. Fixing pai = ri, we now increase pa1 , and adjust pa2 so that P1+P2 =
Q1 + Q2 holds (i.e., (18) is satisfied). Then (i) pa2 increases and (ii)
P lies to the north-west of Q if pai ∈ [ri, p∗ai ].
3. If P is to the north-west of Q, then µ¯(W ) decreases with increase in
pai .
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
r2
r1
Z
A
B
W
µ¯(W ) ≥ 0
P,Q
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p′a2
p′a1
W ′
µ¯(W ′) ≤ µ¯(W )
P ′
Q′
Figure 19: An illustration of claims 1–3. (L) If pai = ri, then by claim 1, we have P = Q,
and µ¯(W ) ≥ 0; (R) If pa1 increases from r1 to p
′
a1 , and if pa2 is adjusted to satisfy (18),
then by claim 2, we have pa2 increasing from r2 to p
′
a2 (say), and P lying on the northwest
of Q. By claim 3, we have µ¯(W ′) ≤ µ¯(W ).
Figure 19 provides an illustration of claims 1–3. We continue to increase
pa1 and adjust pa2 so that (18) is satisfied. We stop when either (i) µ¯(W ) = 0
or (ii) pa2 = p
∗
a2 or (iii) pa1 = p
∗
a1 . We have three cases based on which of
them occurs first. We make the following claims regarding the structures
of optimal mechanism in each of these cases. A summary of these claims is
given in the form of a decision tree in Figure 20.
4. Suppose that µ¯(W ) = 0 occurs when pai < p
∗
ai . Then we claim that
the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6a. The proof is similar to the
proof of Proposition 1.
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State 1
µ¯(W ) = 0
pai < p
∗
ai
Fig. 6a
µ¯(W ) > 0
pa2 = p
∗
a2
State 2
µ¯(W ) > 0
pa1 = p
∗
a1
State 3
µ¯(W ) = 0
pa1 < p
∗
a1
Fig. 6b
µ¯(W ) > 0
pa1 = p
∗
a1
State 4, Fig. 8a
µ¯(W ) > 0
pa2 = p
∗
a2
µ¯(W ) = 0
pa2 < p
∗
a2
Fig. 6d
Figure 20: The decision tree illustrating how to choose the structure of the optimal mech-
anism in Figure 6. Case i in Section 5.1.i starts from State i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
5. Suppose instead that pa2 = p
∗
a2 occurs first, i.e., we have µ¯(W ) > 0 and
pa1 < p
∗
a1 when pa2 equals p
∗
a2 . Then, a2 equals 1, and we stop further
increase in pa2 . The structure in Figure 6a coincides with that in
Figure 6b, and the regions B and W of the canonical partition merge.
The picture is as in Figure 21a. As we increase pa1 to p
′
a1 further, we
fix pa2 corresponding to the pa1 that led to a2 = 1; by Observation
1, the critical point Q and the outer boundary function s2(z2) also
stand fixed. The partition thus moves from Figure 21a to 21b, when
we increase pa1 . Observe that the condition P1 + P2 = Q1 +Q2 is no
longer true, and thus we fix p = P1 + P2 to complete the canonical
partition. We now claim that increasing pa1 moves P towards south-
west, and also decreases µ¯(W ).
Continue to increase pa1 until either (i) µ¯(W ) = 0, or (ii) pa1 = p
∗
a1 . We
have two cases based on which of them occurs first.
6. Suppose that µ¯(W ) = 0 when pa1 < p
∗
a1 , then the optimal mechanism
is as in Figure 6b. The proof again, is similar to the proof of Propo-
sition 1. Equating −µ¯(W ) = 0 for Figure 6b, and substituting for a1
and p, we have
− 8c1b22 + (c2b1 − b2b1 − b2c1)(c2 − 2b2)
+ (c2/2− b1) (c2 − 2b2)2 − (3/8)(c2 − 2b2)3
+
(
c1(4c2 − 3b2) + 3b1b2 + 2(c2 − 2c1)(c2 − 2b2)− 15/8(c2 − 2b2)2
)
pa1
+ (3c2/2− 21/8(c2 − 2b2)) p2a1 − (9/8)p3a1 = 0. (21)
7. Suppose instead that pa1 equals p
∗
a1 , but still µ¯(W ) > 0. Then a1
equals 1, and we stop further increase in pa1 . The regions A and
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W in the canonical partition merge, and the structure in Figure 6b
coincides with that in Figure 6d. The value of p equals P1+P2 = p
∗
a1 .
We fix pa1 = p
∗
a1 , and by Observation 1, the critical point P and
the outer boundary function s1(z1) stand fixed. The partition thus
moves from Figure 22a to 22b. We claim that a decrease in p (from
p∗a1) decreases µ¯(W ). Furthermore, it is easy to see that µ¯(W ) < 0
when p = 0+. Hence, by the continuity of µ¯(W ) in the p parameter,
there must be a p when µ¯(W ) = 0. This happens when p = p∗ :=(√
(c1 + c2)2 + 6b1b2 − c1 − c2
)
/3. The resulting partition is optimal,
and the mechanism is as in Figure 6d.
8. If in contrast to what happens in point 5, suppose that pa1 = p
∗
a1
occurs first, i.e., we have µ¯(W ) > 0 and pa2 < p
∗
a2 when pa1 equals p
∗
a1 .
Then analogous arguments hold by symmetry, and the mechanism is
as in Figure 6c instead of 6b.
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗a2
pa1 W
Z
P
Q B (1, a2)
A
(a1, 1)
a2 = 1
(a)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p′a1
p
W ′
µ¯(W ′)
≤ µ¯(W ∪B)
P ′
P
Q
(b)
Figure 21: Illustration of the transition from Figure 6a to Figure 6b. If we increase pa1
to p′a1 , then by claim 5, the point P moves south-west, and the value of µ¯(W ) decreases.
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
pa1∗
W
Z
A
(a1, 1)
a1 = 1
P
Q
(a)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗
W ′
µ¯(W ′)
≤ µ¯(W ∪ A)
P
Q
(b)
Figure 22: Illustration of the transition from Figure 6b to Figure 6d. If we decrease pa1 ,
then by claim 7, µ¯(W ) decreases.
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The above claims prove that whenever ri ≤ p∗ai , i = 1, 2, the solution
(pa1 , pa2) obtained by solving (18) and (19) gives rise to a valid partition of
the support set D. Furthermore, the structure of the optimal mechanism
turns out to be one of the four structures depicted in Figure 6, based on
whether ai is less than 1 or not.
5.1.2. Case 2: r1 ≤ p∗a1 but r2 > p∗a2
In this case, we have a1 ≤ 1 and a2 > 1 at pai = ri. Thus the technique
of increasing both pai (from ri) does not help here, because by Observation
2, increasing pa2 only increases a2 further. So we use an alternate method.
We fix pa2 = r2 (and thus fixing the correspondingQ and s2(z2)), but change
the line joining Q and pa2 to a line of slope −1, as illustrated in Figure 23.
In other words, we modify the structure, which was as in Figure 6a with
pai = ri, to that in Figure 6b with pa1 = r1 and p = P1 + P2. We claim
that µ¯(W ) ≥ 0 for this case. This can be verified as follows. Substituting
pa1 = r1 in (21), the LHS= −µ¯(W ), becomes
− µ¯(W ) = −(2b2(b1 + c1)− c2(b1 + 3c1))
(b2(2b1 + 3c1)
2 + 8b22(b1 + c1) + 16b1b2c2 + 12b2c1c2 + 6b1c
2
2)
which is nonpositive when c2 ≤ 2b2 b1+c1b1+3c1 . Thus for ci, bi satisfying (7),
µ¯(W ) ≥ 0 holds when pa1 = r1.
We now increase pa1 starting from r1. Notice that the case is now similar
to Case 1, from bullet 6 onwards. The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6b
if µ¯(W ) = 0 occurs when pa1 ≤ p∗a1 , and is as in Figure 6d otherwise. Thus,
when we start from State 2 in the decision tree in Figure 20, we obtain the
procedure to find the optimal mechanism as mentioned above.
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
r2
r1
(1, 1)
(0, 0)
P,Q
Slope
= −1/a2
(a1, 1)
(1, a2)
a2 > 1
(a)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
r2p
r1
(1, 1)
(0, 0)
P,Q
Slope
= −1
(a1, 1)
(b)
Figure 23: An illustration of change of slope in Case 2. The structure is as in Figure 6a
in (a), and as in Figure 6b in (b).
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5.1.3. Case 3: r2 ≤ p∗a2 but r1 > p∗a1
This case is the same as Case 2, except that the optimal mechanism is
as in Figure 6c instead of Figure 6b. We start from State 3 in the decision
tree in Figure 20 to obtain the procedure to find the optimal mechanism.
5.1.4. Case 4: ri > p
∗
ai , i = 1, 2
Fixing pai = ri yields ai > 1. Thus the technique of increasing pai from
ri is not useful here because, by Observation 2, increasing pai only increases
ai further. We thus use an alternate method. We first assume p
∗
a1 ≤ p∗a2 ,
and do the following. (The argument is symmetric when p∗a2 < p
∗
a1 .)
• We force the line joining Q and pa2 to have a slope of −1, as in Case 2.
See the illustration in Figure 24a. Then, µ¯(W ) remains nonnegative
by the same arguments in Case 2. Also, the structure obtained is that
depicted in Figure 6b, with pa1 = r1 and p = P1 + P2. But we have
a1 > 1 because pa1 > p
∗
a1 .
• We now fix pa2 = r2 (which fixes the corresponding Q and s2(z2)), and
decrease pa1 from r1 to p
∗
a1 . See the illustration in Figure 24b. This
decrease moves P towards north-east, decreases a1 to 1, and increases
µ¯(W ). The first two assertions in the previous sentence follow from
Observation 2 and the last assertion can be shown using a proof similar
to the proof of claim 3 in Case 1. Observe that the line z1 + z2 =
c1 + c2 + p
∗
a1 remains within D because p
∗
a1 ≤ p∗a2 ≤ b1. The structure
obtained is that depicted in Figure 6d, with p = p∗a1 .
• We now fix pa1 = p∗a1 (thus fixing the corresponding P and s1(z1)),
and decrease p from p∗a1 to p
∗. Then, the partition moves from Figure
24b to 24c. Furthermore, by the same argument as in claim 7, Case
1, the value of µ¯(W ) decreases, and equals 0 at p = p∗.
We thus obtain a structure which is as in Figure 6d. But to prove the
optimality of the structure, we require the critical points P and Q to be
above the line z1+ z2 = c1+ c2+p
∗. Observe that the point Q may possibly
lie below the line z1+ z2 = c1+ c2+ p
∗, as illustrated in Figure 24d. In case
that happens, we modify Q and the corresponding s2(z2) as follows. We
decrease pa2 from r2 to p
∗
a2 . The point Q thus moves towards north-east,
and is on or above the line z1 + z2 = c1 + c2 + p
∗, since p∗ ≤ p∗a1 ≤ p∗a2 .
Now the partitions with respect to p∗a1 and p
∗
a2 may overlap (as illustrated
in Figure 24e). The overlap occurs whenever Q lies to the north-west of P .
In case of no overlap (as illustrated in Figure 24f), it can be argued that the
optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6d, by constructing γ in the same way
as in the proof of Proposition 1. In case of an overlap, we construct γ (on
W ×W ) as follows. We first fix θ := µ¯W+ + α¯, α¯ constructed with pai = p∗ai .
The following lemma shows that if θ satisfies certain conditions, then there
35
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
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Z
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A
(a)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗a1
r1
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W ′
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Q
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(b)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗a1
p∗
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W ′′
Z ′′
P
Q
(c)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗a1
p∗
r2
P
Q
(d)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗a1
p∗
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P
Q
(e)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
p∗a1
p∗
p∗a2
P
Q
(f)
Figure 24: An illustration of the steps enumerated in Case 4. (a) We force the line joining
Q and r2 to have a slope of −1; (b) Fixing pa2 = r2, we decrease pa1 from r1 to p
∗
a1 ; (c)
Fixing pa1 = r1, we decrease p from p
∗
a1 to p
∗; The point Q may lie either outside Z as in
(c), or inside Z as in (d). In case it is as in (d), we decrease pa2 from r2 to p
∗
a2 . When we
do so, the lines s1(z1) and s2(z2) may either overlap as in (e), or, may remain separate as
in (f).
exists a γ on W ×W that satisfies the dual constraint and the conditions in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Consider a measure θ on W that satisfies the following condi-
tions:
(i) θ 1 µ¯W− ; (ii) θ cvx µ¯W+ ; (iii)
∫
W
‖x‖1 dθ =
∫
W
‖x‖1 dµ¯W+ . (22)
Then, there exists a measure γ on W ×W such that
(a) γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯W ; (b)
∫
W
u d(γ1 − γ2 − µ¯W ) = 0;
(c)u(z) − u(z′) = ‖z − z′‖1, γ − a.e.
Let θ = µ¯W+ +α¯. We now show that θ satisfies the conditions in Lemma 2.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) only involve verifying if α¯ cvx 0 and
∫
D ‖x‖1 dα¯ ≥ 0,
both of which are established in Proposition 2. The following lemma proves
that θ satisfies condition (i).
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Lemma 3. Consider the structure in Figure 6d. Let si(zi) with respect to
µ¯ + α¯ satisfy si(zi) > max(c−i, c1 + c2 + p∗ − zi) for every zi ∈ [ci, ci + bi).
Then, the following hold:
(a) (µ¯+ α¯)(W ∩ {z1 ≥ c1 + t1} ∩ {z2 ≥ c2 + t2}) ≥ 0 for every ti ∈ [0, bi].
(b) θ − µ¯W− = µ¯W + α¯ 1 0.
This shows that the dual variable γ can be constructed even in the case
of an overlap, and so the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6d, whenever
ri > p
∗
ai . Thus, when we start from State 4 in the decision tree in Figure
20, we obtain the optimal mechanism as in Figure 6d.
We have thus computed the optimal mechanism for all ci, bi that satisfy
(7). The results are summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If ci, bi satisfy (7), then the optimal mechanism has one of the
four structures depicted in Figure 6. The exact structure and the values of
(pai , ai, p) are given as follows.
(a) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6a, if there exists pai ∈ [ri, p∗ai ],
i = 1, 2, solving (18) and (19) simultaneously. The values of (ai, p)
are found from (16) and (20).
(b) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6b, if (i) the condition in (a)
does not hold, and (ii) there exists pa1 ∈ [r1, p∗a1 ] that solves (21). The
values of (a1, p) are found from (16) and (20).
The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6c, if (i) and (ii) above hold
with the roles of the indices 1 and 2 swapped. The values of (a2, p) are
found analogously.
(c) The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6d with p = p∗, if conditions
in (a)− (b) do not hold.
5.2. Optimal mechanisms when c1b1 is small but
c2
b2
is large
Consider the case when c1 ≤ b1, but c2 > 2b2(b1+ c1)/(b1+3c1). Notice
that c2 > b2 for any c1 ≤ b1, and thus this case violates (7). When c2
crosses 2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), we claim that the critical point P moves
outside the support D. From (17), we have P2 ≥ c2 iff pa1 ≤ 2b2 − c2. So
to prove the preceding claim, it suffices to prove that when {c1 ≤ b1, c2 >
2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1)}, the solution in the interval [(2b2 − c2)/3, b2] that
solves (21) is at least 2b2 − c2.
Substituting pa1 = 2b2−c2 in the left-hand side of (21), we get 2b2(2b2(b1+
3c1) − c2(b1 + c1)) < 0 when c2 > 2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1). Substituting
pa1 = (2b2 − c2)/3, we get −38b2c1(b2 + c2) < 0, and substituting pa1 = b2,
we have (b2 + c2)(8b2(b1 − c1) + (c2 − b2)(c2 +3b2))/8 > 0 when c1 ≤ b1 and
c2 ≥ b2. So the solution for (21) in the interval [(2b2 − c2)/3, b2] is at least
2b2 − c2. We have proved our claim.
At c2 = 2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), we have P2 = c2, i.e., P touches the
bottom boundary of D. The structure in Figure 6b coincides with that in
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Figure 8a. We anticipate that adding on the top-left boundary a shuffling
measure whose density is linear in [c1, c1 + pa1/a1] and is a constant in
[c1 + pa1/a1, c1 + p] would yield the structure in Figure 8a. We do the
following.
• We construct a shuffling measure β¯ with parameters pa1 , a1, and p,
and find the conditions on the parameters for β¯ cvx 0 to hold.
• We then identify the canonical partition associated with µ¯+β¯. Observe
that it only involves computing s1(·), since we do not have region B
in Figure 8a.
• To prove the validity of the partition, we (i) analyze how the param-
eters a1 and p vary when pa1 varies, and then (ii) fix pa1 = b2 and
decrease it until we get p = (b1 − c1)/2.
• For c2 ∈ [2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2], we prove that if
a1 ≤ 1 at the stopping point, then the optimal mechanism is as in
Figure 8a; otherwise it is as in Figure 8b.
• For c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1−c1))2, we proceed as follows. We first prove that if
c2 = 2b2(b1/(b1−c1))2, then p = (b1−c1)/2 occurs when pa1 = a1 = 0.
Then we proceed to prove that the optimal mechanism is as in Figure
10 whenever c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2.
We now split this case into two subcases: (i) c2 ∈ [2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 +
3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2], i.e., c2b2 has large but not too large values, and (ii)
c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2, i.e., c2b2 is very large.
5.2.1. Optimal mechanisms when c1b1 is small and
c2
b2
has large but not too
large values
Let c1 ≤ b1, c2 ∈ [2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2]. We begin
by constructing the shuffling measure β¯ (see Figure 25). Define the density
βs in the interval D˜
(1) := [c1, c1 + p]× {c2 + b2} as
βs(x, c2 + b2) := (2b2 + (3a1(x− c1)− c2 − 3pa1)1(x ≤ c1 + pa1/a1))/(b1b2).
(23)
Define βp := c1(b2−pa1)/(b1b2)δ(c1,c2+b2), a point measure at (c1, c2+b2)
with mass c1(b2 − pa1)/(b1b2). Define
β¯(A) :=
∫ c1+p
c1
1A(x, c2 + b2)βs(x, c2 + b2) + βp(A ∩ (c1, c2 + b2))
for all measurable sets A ⊆ D˜(1). Observe that the densities of β¯ and α¯
differ only in the interval [c1 + pa1/a1, c1 + p] × {c2 + b2}. A jump occurs
when βs reaches 2b2 − c2.
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β¯(x)
x
c1(b2 − pa1)
2b2 − c2 − 3pa1
2b2 − c2
2b2
c1 c1 + pa1/a1 c1 + p
Figure 25: The measure β¯.
We now identify the canonical partition of D with respect to µ¯+ β¯, along
the same steps used in Section 5.1. The construction is illustrated in Figure
26.
s1(z1)
(c1, c2)
(c1 + b1, c2 + b2)(c1, c2 + b2)
(c1 + pa1/a1, c2)
(c
1
,
c
2
+
p
a
1
)
(a)
(c1 + p, c2)
(b)
((c1 + b1)/2, c2)
Z
A W
(c)
Figure 26: An illustration of (a) the construction of s1(z1), (b) the construction of W ,
and (c) the canonical partition.
(a) The outer boundary function s1 : [c1, c1+p]→ [c2, c2+b2], with respect
to µ¯+ β¯, is computed using the same expressions in (15) but with α
(i)
s
and α
(i)
p replaced respectively by βs and βp. It is given by
s1(z1) = c2 + (pa1 − a1(z1 − c1))+.
(b) We now choose the critical price p so that µ¯(W ) = 0. From an exam-
ination of Figure 8a and simple geometry considerations, it is imme-
diate that µ¯(W ) = 0 iff b2(c1 + b1) + (b1 − p)(−2b2) = 0, which yields
p = (b1 − c1)/2.
(c) We thus have the following canonical partition of D.
Z = {(z1, z2) : z1 ≤ pa1/a1, z2 ≤ s1(z1)},
W = [c1 + p, c1 + b1]× [c2, c2 + b2],
A = D\(W ∪ Z).
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We now derive the parameters pa1 and a1, by imposing β¯ cvx 0. All
proofs of this subsection are relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 3. Consider the structure in Figure 8a. Then, β¯ cvx 0 is
satisfied, if
p =
3p2a1/(2a1) + c2pa1/a1 − c1(b2 − pa1)
2b2
=
pa1
a1
√
pa1 + c2
2b2
. (24)
If p = (b1 − c1)/2, then β¯ cvx 0 holds when a1 satisfies
a1 = pa1
(
3
2pa1 + c2
b1b2 − c1pa1
)
=
pa1
b1 − c1
√
2(pa1 + c2)
b2
, (25)
and if pa1 is a solution to
2b21b
2
2c2 − c22b2(b1 − c1)2 + pa1(2b21b22 − 4b1b2c1c2 − 3c2b2(b1 − c1)2)
+ p2a1(2c
2
1c2 − 4b1b2c1 − 9b2(b1 − c1)2/4) + p3a1(2c21) = 0. (26)
We have thus identified the parameters of the canonical partition. We
now verify if the values of (pa1 , a1, p) so obtained give rise to a valid partition.
A partition is valid, if (i) pa1 ∈ [0, b2], (ii) pa1/a1 ≤ p, and (iii) ai ∈ [0, 1].
To find the values of ci, bi for which the partition is valid, we make a
series of claims, proofs of which are in Appendix B.
1. At pa1 = b2, the values of a1, pa1/a1, and p that satisfy (24) are given
by a1 =∞, and pa1/a1 = p = 0. See Figure 27a.
2. So we fix pa1 = b2 and decrease pa1 . Suppose a1 and p are modified so
as to satisfy (24). Then, decreasing pa1 from b2 to (2b2−c2)+ decreases
a1, but increases both pa1/a1 and p. The change of pa1/a1 and a1 on
decreasing pa1 is illustrated in Figure 27b.
3. We decrease pa1 until p = (b1 − c1)/2. Suppose c1 ≤ b1 and c2 ∈
[2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2]. Then, the pair (pa1 , a1)
that solves (24) when p = (b1 − c1)/2 satisfies (i) pa1 ≥ (2b2 − c2)+
and (ii) pa1/a1 ≤ p. See Figure 27c.
4. If the value of a1 so obtained is at most 1, then the optimal mechanism
is as in Figure 8a.
5. In case a1 > 1, then the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 8b.
We now assert the following.
Theorem 4. Let {c1 ≤ b1, c2 ∈ [2b2(b1+ c1)/(b1+3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1− c1))2]}.
Then, there exists pa1 ∈ [(2b2 − c2)+, b2] that solves (26). If a1 found from
(25) is at most 1, then the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 8a, with
(pa1 , a1) as found above, and p = (b1 − c1)/2. Instead, if a1 > 1, then the
optimal mechanism is as in Figure 8b, with p = p∗.
40
pa1
a1
p
pa1
a1 =∞
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p′a1
p′a1
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pa1
pa1
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p
a′1 < a1
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pa1
pa1
a1
b1−c1
2
pa1 ≥ (2b2 − c2)+
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Figure 27: An illustration of the steps enumerated in Section 5.2.1. (a) If pa1 = b2,
then a1 = ∞, and pa1/a1 = p = 0; (b) If pa1 decreases to p
′
a1 , then a
′
1 < a1, but
p′a1/a
′
1 > pa1/a1 and p
′ > p; (c) If p = (b1 − c1)/2, then pa2 ≥ (2b2 − c2)+.
5.2.2. Optimal mechanisms when c1b1 is small but
c2
b2
is very large
Let c1 ≤ b1 and c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2. Consider c2 = 2b2(b1/(b1 −
c1))
2. We start from pa1 = b2 yet again, decrease pa1 , and modify a1 and p
according to (24).
Claim 1. At pa1 = 0, we claim that a1 = 0 and p = (b1 − c1)/2.
The structure is now the same as depicted in Figure 10.
We now construct a shuffling measure that is a variant of β¯. Observe
from (25) that limpa1→0(pa1/a1) = b1b2/c2. So, when c2 = 2b2(b1/(b1−c1))2,
the density βs (in (23)) becomes a step function with values (2b2−c2)/(b1b2)
and 2b2/(b1b2) with the jump occurring at (c1+ b1b2/c2, c2+ b2). We fix this
density for every c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2, and call it βes. We also define a
point measure βep := c1b2/(b1b2)δ(c1,c2+b2). The resulting measure is
β¯e(A) :=
∫ c1+p
c1
1A(x, c2 + b2)βes(x, c2 + b2) dx+ βep(A ∩ (c1, c2 + b2))
for all measurable sets A ⊆ D˜(1). The components of β¯e are given by
βes(x, c2 + b2) =
{
(2b2 − c2)/(b1b2) if x ∈ [c1, c1 + b1b2/c2]
2b2/(b1b2) if x ∈ (c1 + b1b2/c2, (c1 + b1)/2],
βep(c1, c2 + b2) = c1b2/(b1b2). (27)
The canonical partition of the support D with respect to µ¯ + β¯e is the
same as constructed in Section 5.2.1 (as illustrated in Figure 26), with pa1 =
a1 = 0, and pa1/a1 = b1b2/c2.
We now verify if β¯e cvx 0.
Proposition 4. Suppose c1 ≤ b1 and c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2. Then, β¯e
satisfies (i) β¯e cvx 0 and (ii)
∫
D˜(1) u dβ¯e = 0 for constant u.
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We now assert that the following theorem holds, proof of which is rele-
gated to Appendix B.
Theorem 5. The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 10, when {c1 ≤ b1, c2 ≥
2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2}.
Put together, Theorem 4 of Section 5.2.1 and Theorem 5 characterize the
optimal mechanisms for ci, bi satisfying {c1 ≤ b1, c2 ≥ 2b2(b1+c1)/(b1+3c1)}.
5.3. Optimal mechanisms when c2b2 is small but
c1
b1
is large
Consider the case when c2 < b2 but c1 > 2b1(b2 + c2)/(b2 + 3c2). We
define the density βs in the interval D˜
(2) : {c1 + b1} × [c2, c2 + p] as
βs(c1 + b1, x) := (2b1 + (3a2(x− c2)− c1 − 3pa2)1(x ≤ c2 + pa2/a2))/(b1b2).
(28)
We also define βp := c2(b1 − pa2)/(b1b2)δ(c1+b1,c2), a point measure at (c1 +
b1, c2) with mass c2(b1 − pa2)/(b1b2). Define
β¯(A) :=
∫ c2+p
c2
1A(c1 + b1, x)βs(c1 + b1, x) + βp(A ∩ (c1 + b1, c2))
for all measurable sets A ⊆ D˜(2). With symmetric arguments, we have the
following assertions similar to Proposition 3, Theorem 4, and Theorem 5.
5.3.1. Optimal mechanisms when c2b2 is small and
c1
b1
has large but not too
large values
The following is the analog of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. Consider the structure in Figure 11a. If p = (b2 − c2)/2,
then β¯ cvx 0 is satisfied, if a2 satisfies
a2 = pa2
(
3
2pa2 + c1
b1b2 − c2pa2
)
=
pa2
b2 − c2
√
2(pa2 + c1)
b1
(29)
and if pa2 is a solution to
2b21b
2
2c1 − c21b1(b2 − c2)2 + pa2(2b21b22 − 4b1b2c1c2 − 3c1b1(b2 − c2)2)
+ p2a2(2c
2
2c1 − 4b1b2c2 − 9b1(b2 − c2)2/4) + p3a2(2c22) = 0. (30)
We also have the analog of Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. Let {c2 ≤ b2, c1 ∈ [2b1(b2+ c2)/(b2+3c2), 2b1(b2/(b2− c2))2]}.
Then, there exists pa2 ∈ [(2b1 − c1)+, b1] that solves (30). If a2 found from
(29) is at most 1, then the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 11a, with
(pa2 , a2) as found above, and p = (b2 − c2)/2. Instead, if a2 > 1, then the
optimal mechanism is as in Figure 8b, with p = p∗.
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5.3.2. Optimal mechanisms when c2b2 is small but
c1
b1
is very large
The next assertion is the analog of Theorem 5.
Theorem 7. The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 11c when {c2 ≤
b2, c1 ≥ 2b1(b2/(b2 − c2))2}.
5.4. Optimal mechanisms when c1b1 and
c2
b2
are large
When c1 ≥ b1 and c2 ≥ b2, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6d when {c1 ≥ b1, c2 ≥
b2}.
A simple way to prove this theorem is to use Menicucci et al. [31, Prop. 3].
The proposition asserts that for negative power rate distributions, if zi −
(1 − Fi(zi))/fi(zi) ≥ 0 for all zi ∈ D, i = 1, 2, then pure bundling is the
optimal mechanism. The conditions of the proposition clearly hold when
ci ≥ bi, i = 1, 2, and thus the theorem is proved.
Alternatively, we can prove this theorem via the duality approach used
in this paper. We fix θ = µ¯W+ and show that θ satisfies all the conditions of
Lemma 2. This shows the existence of a dual measure γ that satisfies the
dual constraints and the complementary slackness constraints. The complete
proof is in Appendix B.
6. Extension to Other Distributions
Optimal mechanism for uniform distribution over any rectangle was
found only using α¯ and its variants as shuffling measures. We can now
ask if there is a generalization of α¯ for other distributions. For distributions
with constant negative power rate, we anticipate that the optimal mecha-
nisms would be of the same form as in uniform distributions (based on the
result of Wang and Tang [42]), and that they can be arrived at using similar
α¯. We propose using a “generalized” α¯, whose components are
α(1)s (z1, c2 + b2) = f1(z1)(−∆(1− F2(pa1 − a1(z1 − c1))))
− f1(z1)(c2 + b2)f2(c2 + b2), z ∈ [c1, P1],
α(1)p (c1, c2 + b2) = c1f1(c1)(1− F2(pa1)), (31)
along with similarly defined α
(2)
s and α
(2)
p . Recall that ∆ is the power rate of
the distribution defined as −3− z1f ′1(z1)/f1(z1)− z2f ′2(z2)/f2(z2). Observe
that the α¯ mentioned above reduces to the α¯ used in the case of uniform
distributions, when we substitute fi(zi) = 1, and ∆ = −3 (see (14)).
We have six parameters to be computed: pa1 , pa2 , a1, a2, P1, and Q2.
Defining D˜(1) := [c1, P1]× {c2 + b1} and D˜(2) := {c1 + b1} × [c2, Q2], we use
the following six equations for computing these parameters.
43
• We require α(1) cvx 0. Using Proposition 2, we impose α¯(1)(D˜(1)) =∫
[c1,P1]
x α¯(1)(dx, c2 + b2) = 0.
• Similarly, we require α(2) cvx 0. We thus impose α¯(2)(D˜(2)) =∫
[c2,Q2]
x α¯(2)(c1 + b1, dx) = 0.
• We require that the critical points P and Q be connected by a line
z1 + z2 = p. We thus impose P1 + P2 = Q1 + Q2 or P1 + c2 + pa1 −
a1(P1 − c1) = c1 + pa2 − (Q2 − c2)/a2.
• We finally impose µ¯(W ) = 0.
If there exists a tuple (pa1 , pa2 , a1, a2, P1, Q2) that solves these six equa-
tions simultaneously and forms a valid canonical partition, then we can
assert that the optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 6a, using the
same arguments in section 5.1.
We now consider an example of a distribution with negative constant
power rate. Let f1(z) = f2(z) = 2z/(2c + 1) when z ∈ [c, c+ 1]. The power
rate ∆ = −5, a negative constant. We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let fi(z) = 2z/(2c+1), z ∈ [c, c+1]. When c = 0, the optimal
mechanism is as in Figure 6a, with pa1 =
√
0.6, a1 = 0, and p = 1.09597.
When c = 0.1, the optimal mechanism is the same, with pa1 = 0.79615,
a1 = 0.23198, and P1 = 0.364655.
The detailed proof is in Appendix C. We first characterize the optimal
mechanism for c = 0 using the method outlined in Section 3, without any
shuffling measures. We then consider the case c = 0.1 where we introduce
the shuffling measure α¯ in (31), compute the parameters by solving the above
six equations, and prove that the canonical partition obtained is valid.
For other structures, one could follow a similar procedure as done for
Figure 6a and one could obtain parameter ranges for which those structures
are optimal. On the basis of the above development, we conjecture that the
generalized shuffling measure in (31) and its variants should suffice for the
class of distributions having negative constant power rates.
7. Conclusion
We solved the problem of computing the optimal solution in the two-item
one-buyer setting, when the valuations of the buyer are uniformly distributed
in an arbitrary rectangle on the positive quadrant. Our results show that
a wide range of structures arise out of different values of (c1, c2). When
the buyer guarantees that his valuations are at least (c1, c2), the seller offers
different menus based on the guaranteed (c1, c2) and the upper bounds (c1+
b1, c2 + b2). The seller also finds it optimal to sell the items individually for
certain values of (c1, c2), to sell the items as a bundle for certain other values,
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and to pose the menu as an interplay of individual sale and a bundled sale
for the remaining values of (c1, c2).
Our solutions used the duality approach in [18]. We constructed a “shuf-
fling measure” for various distributions that are not bordered by the coor-
dinate axes, thereby extending the pool of solvable problems using the dual
method. Our results for the linear distribution function suggests that the
method of constructing shuffling measures could be used to solve the prob-
lem for a wider class of distributions. We conjecture that our method works
for all distributions with constant negative power rate.
Another approach based on the idea of virtual valuation was used by
Pavlov [36] to compute the optimal solution when the buyer’s valuations
are uniformly distributed in [c, c+1]2, for arbitrary nonnegative values of c.
In a companion paper where we consider the unit-demand setting [41], we
highlight the sensitivity of the structure of the shuffling measure to the pa-
rameters. For that setting, we do not as yet fully understand what shuffling
measures will work. In that paper, we follow Pavlov’s approach to compute
the optimal solution when z ∼ Unif[c, c+b1]×[c, c+b2], for arbitrary nonneg-
ative values of (c, b1, b2). The two works, taken together, provide concrete
examples of nontrivial optimal structures and thus provide insight on op-
timal mechanisms likely to occur under more general settings. They also
help us understand the pros and cons of the dual and the virtual valuation
methods under different situations.
Our results show the existence of multi-dimensional optimal mechanisms
with no exclusion region. The optimal mechanism has no exclusion region
when the minimum valuation for one of the items is small and that for the
other item is very large. This is interesting since the results of Armstrong [1]
and Barelli et al. [4] state that the optimal mechanisms in multi-dimensional
setting have a nontrivial exclusion region under some sufficient conditions.
The setting in our paper does not satisfy their sufficient conditions.
The optimal mechanisms in the uniform case considered in this paper are
stochastic when both c1b1 and
c2
b2
are small, and are deterministic when either
c1
b1
or c2b2 is sufficiently large. We can now ask the following question: can
we characterize the set of distributions for which deterministic mechanisms
are optimal? The work in [29] answered this under the assumption that
the support set is [0, 1]2. Characterizing them for general support sets is a
direction of future work.
Another direction is to characterize those distributions for which deter-
ministic mechanisms give a constant-factor approximation. The works in
[13, 14] considered the unit-demand setting, and proved that if the distri-
butions on the items are either uncorrelated or have a certain positive cor-
relation, then deterministic mechanisms provide at least a constant-fraction
of the optimal revenue. Characterizing such distributions for the setting we
consider in this paper is another direction for future work.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A. Proofs from Section 5.1
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider h to be the affine shift of any in-
creasing convex function g (i.e., h = β1g + β2, β1 > 0, β2 ∈ R) such that
h(c1+ l1) = c1+ l1, and h(c1+ l2) = c1+ l2. Observe that h(x) ≤ x when the
density of α is nonpositive, and h(x) ≥ x when the density is nonnegative.
Now we have∫
[c1,c1+m1]
g dα
=
1
β1
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
hdα
=
1
β1
(∫
[c1,c1+m1]
(h(x)− x)α(dx) +
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
xα(dx)
)
=
1
β1
(∫
[c1,c1+m1]
(h(x)− x)α(dx)
)
≥ 0
where the first equality follows from α([c1, c1 +m1]) = 0, the third equality
follows from
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
xα(dx) = 0, and the last inequality follows because
sgn (h(x)− x) = sgn (α(x)) for every x ∈ [c1, c1 +m1]. Hence the result.
Proof of Corollary 1: We now find the values of m1 and a1 for which
α¯(1)(D˜(1)) =
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
(x− c1) α¯(1)(dx, c2 + b2) = 0 holds.
α¯(1)(D˜(1)) = ((2b2 − c2 − 3pa1)m1 + (3/2)a1m21 + c1(b2 − pa1))/(b1b2) = 0
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
(x−c1) α¯(1)(dx, c2+b2) = ((2b2−c2−3pa1)m21/2+a1m31)/(b1b2) = 0
(A.1)
Solving both of these equations simultaneously, we obtain m1 = 4c1(b2 −
pa1)/(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1) and a1 = (c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)2/(8c1(b2 − pa1)). So
α¯(1)(D˜(1)) =
∫
[c1,c1+m1]
(x− c1) α¯(1)(dx, c2 + b2) = 0 holds at these values of
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m1 and a1. We also have
∫
D˜(1) f dα¯
(1) = 0 for any affine f , because f(x) can
be written as β1x+ β2.
α¯(1) cvx 0 follows from Proposition 2.
Proofs of Claims for Case 1
1. The lower bounds of ri are clear because for every ci, bi ≥ 0, the
inequalities (2bi +5ci) ≥ (2bi +3ci) and (2bi − 3ci) ≤ (2bi +3ci) hold.
Now we prove that if ci, bi satisfy (7), then
2b2(2b1+5c1)−c2(2b1−3c1)
3(2b1+3c1)
≤ b2
holds. Rewriting this condition, we have b2(2b1−c1)+c2(2b1−3c1) ≥ 0.
When {c2 ≤ b2, c1 ≤ 2b1 b2+c2b2+3c2 } is satisfied, we have
b2(2b1 − c1) + c2(2b1 − 3c1)
≥ 2b1b2
(
1− b2 + c2
b2 + 3c2
)
+ 2b1c2
(
1− 3 b2 + c2
b2 + 3c2
)
≥ 0
where the first inequality follows from c1 ≤ 2b1 b2+c2b2+3c2 . When {c1 ≤
b1, c2 ≤ 2b2 b1+c1b1+3c1 } is satisfied, the condition trivially holds for c1 ≤
2b1
3 . When c1 ∈ [2b13 , b1], we have
b2(2b1 − c1) + c2(2b1 − 3c1) ≥ 3b2(2b1 + 3c1)(b1 − c1)/(b1 + 3c1) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from c2 ≤ 2b2 b1+c1b1+3c1 , and the sec-
ond inequality from c1 ≤ b1. This establishes r1 ∈ [(2b2 − c2)/3, b2].
Establishing r2 ∈ [(2b1 − c1)/3, b1] is analogous.
Substituting pai = ri in (17), we obtain
Pi = Qi = ci +
4bi(b−i + c−i)− 2ci(b−i + 3c−i)
3(2b−i + 3c−i)
.
The points P andQ thus coincide, when pai = ri. Substituting pai = ri
in (19), the LHS equals −43c1c2(b1b2 + b1c2 + b2c1) ≤ 0. Recalling
that (19) was constructed by equating −µ¯(W ) = 0, we conclude that
µ¯(W ) ≥ 0 when pai = ri.
2. Starting from pai = ri, we increase pa1 and adjust pa2 so that P1+P2 =
Q1 + Q2 holds (i.e., (18) is satisfied). Assume pa2 decreases. By
Observation 2, an increase in pa1 moves P towards south-west, causing
a decrease in P1 + P2. Similarly, a decrease in pa2 moves Q towards
north-east, causing an increase in Q1+Q2. But when pai = ri, we have
P1+P2 = Q1+Q2, by the previous claim. So P1+P2 = Q1+Q2 fails to
satisfy when pa1 increases and pa2 decreases, leading to a contradiction.
Thus pa2 must increase.
We proceed to prove that P lies to the north-west of Q when pai ∈
[ri, p
∗
ai ]. We first note that a1 ≤ 1 and a2 ≤ 1 (from (16)) for all
pai ∈ [ri, p∗ai ]. To prove P lies to the north-west of Q, we show that
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Figure A.28: An illustration to indicate
µ¯(W ) decreases when pa1 increases to
p′a1 .
Figure A.29: The structure in Figure 6a
shown with D and W partitioned.
P1−Q1 decreases when both pa1 and pa2 are increased so as to satisfy
(18).
We first find the expression for
∂pa2
∂pa1
when P1 + P2 = Q1 + Q2 (i.e.,
equation (18)) is satisfied. Differentiating on both sides of P1 + P2 =
Q1 +Q2, we have(
4c1(c2 + b2)
(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)2
+
1
2
)
∂pa1 =
(
4c2(c1 + b1)
(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)2
+
1
2
)
∂pa2
⇒ ∂pa2
∂pa1
=
4c1(c2+b2)
(c2−2b2+3pa1)2 +
1
2
4c2(c1+b1)
(c1−2b1+3pa2)2 +
1
2
.
Differentiating P1 −Q1 w.r.t. pa1 , we have
∂
∂pa1
(P1 −Q1) = − 4c1(c2 + b2)
(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)2
+
1
2
∂pa2
∂pa1
=
(1/2)
8c2(c1+b1)
(c1−2b1+3pa2)2
+ 1
(
1− 64c1c2(c1 + b1)(c2 + b2)
(c2 − 2b2 + 3pa1)2(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)2
)
≤ 0
where the second equality follows by substitution of
∂pa2
∂pa1
, and the
inequality follows because a1a2 ≤ 1 from (16) implies (c2 − 2b2 +
3pa1)
2(c1 − 2b1 + 3pa2)2 ≤ 64c1c2(b2 − pa1)(b1 − pa2) ≤ 64c1c2(b2 +
c2)(b1 + c1). With P1 − Q1 = 0 at pa1 = r1, and the derivative w.r.t.
pa1 is nonpositive whenever a1a2 ≤ 1, we have P1 − Q1 ≤ 0 for all
pa1 ∈ [r1, p∗a1 ]. The other condition Q2 − P2 ≤ 0 automatically holds
because P1 + P2 = Q1 +Q2. Hence P lies to the north-west of Q.
3. If P is to the north-west of Q, the illustration in Figure A.28 shows
that µ¯(W ) decreases when either pa1 or pa2 increases.
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4. We first prove that P and Q in Figure 6a lies within D. This is true
if (a) pai ≤ b−i, (b) ai ∈ [0, 1], and (c) P is to the north-west of Q.
Condition (a) holds because p∗ai ≤ b−i and pai ≤ p∗ai . Condition (b)
holds because pai ≤ p∗ai ≤ b−i ⇒ ai ∈ [0, 1]. Condition (c) holds by
claim 2.
To prove that the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6a, we first par-
tition W = D\(Z ∪A ∪B) into three regions:
W1 : [P1, c1+b1)× [s1(z1), c2+b2], W2 : [s2(z2), c1+b1]× [Q2, s1(z1)],
W3 : the remaining region.
See Figure A.29. We now construct u and γ in the same way as in the
proof of Proposition 1, with µ¯ replaced by (µ¯+ α¯).
5. By Observation 2, we know that increasing pa1 moves P towards south-
west. The claim that µ¯(W ) reduces when pa1 increases, can be shown
by an illustration similar to that in Figure A.28.
6. We first show that the point P is within D. Observe that the value of
p reduces from p∗a2 by construction. So p
∗
a2 ≤ b1 ⇒ p ≤ b1. Further,
pa1 ≤ p∗a1 implies pa1 ≤ b2, both of which imply a1 ∈ [0, 1]. All these
imply that P1 ∈ [c1, c1+ b1] and P2 ≤ c2+ b2. It remains to show that
P2 ≥ c2. From (17), we have P2 ≤ c2 iff pa1 ≤ 2b2 − c2. We now show
that pa1 ≤ 2b2 − c2.
We know that µ¯(W ) = 0 occurs when pa1 solves (21). Substituting
pa1 = (2b2−c2)/3, we obtain LHS= −83b2c1(b2+c2) < 0, and substitut-
ing pa1 = 2b2−c2, we obtain LHS= 2b2(2b2(b1+c1)−c2(b1+3c1)). Ob-
serve that ci, bi that satisfy (7) also satisfy (2b2(b1+c1)−c2(b1+3c1)) ≥
0. Thus for the cases under consideration, the value of pa1 that satisfies
µ¯(W ) = 0 is at most 2b2 − c2.
To prove that the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6b, we construct
the dual variable γ similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
7. A decrease in p continues to decrease µ¯(W ). This can be observed as
follows. A decrease in p only removes negative µ¯-measure from Z, and
thus µ¯(Z) increases. So µ¯(W ) must decrease to satisfy µ¯(D) = 0.
8. The claim holds by symmetry.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider θ 1 µ¯W− to hold. Strassen’s theorem
[16, Thm. 6.3] states that under this condition, there exists a joint measure
γ such that its marginals γ1 and γ2 equal θ and µ¯
W− respectively, and z ≥ z′
(component-wise) holds γ(z, z′)-a.e. We now verify if this γ satisfies the
duality conditions, and conditions in Lemma 1.
(a) θ cvx µ¯W+ holds by assumption (ii) in the lemma. Thus we have
γ1 − γ2 = (θ − µ¯W− ) cvx (µ¯W+ − µ¯W− ) = µ¯W .
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Figure A.30: An illustration of a possi-
ble si(zi) that satisfies the assumptions
in Lemma 3.
Figure A.31: Constructing an increasing
set with boundaries parallel to the axes.
(b) When z ∈W , we have u(z) = ‖z‖1 − k for some constant k. So,∫
W
u d(γ1−γ2−µ¯W ) =
∫
W
u d(θ−µ¯W− −µ¯W ) =
∫
W
(‖x‖1−k) d(θ−µ¯W+ ).
θ(W ) = µ¯+(W ) is an easy consequence of the assumption θ cvx µ¯W+ .
So we have∫
W
u d(γ1 − γ2 − µ¯W ) =
∫
W
‖z‖1 d(θ − µ¯W+ )− k(θ(W )− µ¯+(W )) = 0
where the last equality holds by assumption (iii) in the lemma.
(c) u(z) = ‖z‖1 − k for some constant k, if z ∈ W . So u(z) − u(z′) =
‖z − z′‖1 for every {z, z′ ∈ W : z ≥ z′}. But z ≥ z′ holds γ(z, z′)-a.e.
So, u(z)− u(z′) = (z1 − z′1) + (z2 − z′2) = ‖z − z′‖1 holds γ-a.e.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The assumption in the lemma is that the function s1(z1) is always above
the lines z1+ z2 = c1+ c2+ p and z2 = c2, and the function s2(z2) is always
to the right of the lines z1 + z2 = c1 + c2 + p and z1 = c1. See Figure A.30
for an example. Defining X(t1, t2) := W ∩ {z1 ≥ c1 + t1, z2 ≥ c2 + t2}, we
now proceed to prove that (µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for every ti ∈ [0, bi].
We start with t2 = 0, i.e., we first show that (µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, 0)) ≥ 0 holds
for every t1 ∈ [0, b1]. We first note that X(t1, 0) =W\{z1 < c1+ t1}. Recall
that s1(z1) is defined as the point at which the integral of the densities of
µ¯+α¯ (from c2+b2) vanishes. As s1(z1) lies above the line z1+z2 = c1+c2+p
for each z1, we have (µ¯+ α¯)
W ({z1 < c1 + t1}) to be an integral of negative
numbers in each vertical line, when t1 ∈ [0, b1). So we have
(µ¯+α¯)(X(t1, 0)) = (µ¯+α¯)(W\{z1 < c1+t1}) = 0−(a negative number) ≥ 0
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for every t1 ∈ [0, b1). When t1 = b1, we have (µ¯ + α¯)(X(b1, 0)) = µ¯+({c1 +
b1}× [c2, c2+ b2]) ≥ 0. Thus (µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds for every (t1, t2) ∈
([0, b1], 0). The proof when (t1, t2) ∈ (0, [0, b2]) is analogous.
We now show that (µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds for t1, t2 > 0 as well. We
have four cases.
• Consider t1 + t2 ≤ p∗. Then, X(t1, t2) contains portions of the line
z1 + z2 = c1 + c2 + p
∗, and we have
(µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, t2))
= (µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, 0)) + (µ¯ + α¯)(X(0, t2))− (µ¯+ α¯)(W )
≥ 0.
• Consider t1 + t2 > p∗, and (t1, t2) = (P1 − c1, Q2 − c2) This refers
to the shaded region in Figure A.30. Observe that when t1 ≥ (2b2 −
c2)/3 or t2 ≥ (2b1 − c1)/3, the integral of the densities of µ¯ + α¯ is
nonnegative in each vertical (or horizontal) line of X(t1, t2), and thus
(µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds trivially. So we consider P1 − c1 ≤ (2b1 −
c1)/3 and Q2 − c2 ≤ (2b2 − c2)/3. Now we have
(µ¯+ α¯)(X(P1 − c1, Q2 − c2))
= µ¯([P1, c1 + b1)× [2
3
(c2 + b2), c2 + b2])
+ µ¯([
2
3
(c1 + b1), c1 + b1]× [Q2, 2
3
(c2 + b2)])
+ µs({c1 + b1} × [2
3
(c2 + b2), c2 + b2])
+ µ¯([P1,
2
3
(c1 + b1)]× [Q2, 2
3
(c2 + b2)])
= µs({c1 + b1} × [2(c2 + b2)/3, (c2 + b2)])
+ µ¯([P1, 2(c1 + b1)/3]× [Q2, 2(c2 + b2)/3])
≥ (c1 + b1)(c2 + b2)/3− 3(2(c1 + b1)/3 −Q1)(2(c2 + b2)/3− P2)
= (c1 + b1)(c2 + b2)/3− 3((c1 + p∗a2)/2
− (c1 + b1)/3)((c2 + p∗a1)/2− (c2 + b2)/3)
≥ (c1 + b1)(c2 + b2)/3− 3(c1 + b1)/6(c2 + b2)/6
≥ 0
where the second equality here holds because s1(z1) = 2(c2 + b2)/3 in
the interval [P1, c1 + b1), and thus µ¯([P1, c1 + b1]× [2(c2 + b2)/3, (c2 +
b2)]) is an integral of zero measures in each vertical line; an analogous
argument holds for µ¯([2(c1 + b2)/3, (c2 + b1)]× [Q2, 2(c2 + b2)/3]); the
first inequality holds because we have P2 ≤ Q2 and Q1 ≤ P1 in the
overlapping case; the third equality follows by substitution of P2 and
Q1; and the second inequality follows from p
∗
ai ≤ b−i.
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We now consider the case when t1+ t2 > p
∗ and {t1 ∈ [P1 − c1, (2b2 −
c2)/3], t2 ∈ [Q2 − c2, (2b1 − c1)/3]}. We have
(µ¯+ α¯)(X(t1, t2)) = (µ¯+ α¯)(X(P1 − c1, Q2 − c2))
− µ¯([P1, c1 + t1]× [2(c2 + b2)/3, (c2 + b2)])
− µ¯([2(c1 + b1)/3, c1 + b1]× [Q2, c2 + t2])
− (a negative number) ≥ 0.
where the inequality holds because s1(z1) = 2(c2+b2)/3 in the interval
[P1, c1 + t1], and thus µ¯([P1, c1 + t1] × [2(c2 + b2)/3, (c2 + b2)]) is an
integral of zero measures in each vertical line; an analogous argument
holds for µ¯([2(c1 + b1)/3, (c1 + b1)]× [Q2, c2 + t2]).
• Consider t1+t2 > p∗, t1 ≥ P1−c1 but t2 ≤ Q2−c2. Let c1+t1 ≥ s2(c2).
Recall that the density of α¯ is the lowest at z2 = c2, and thus s2(z2)
is maximized at z2 = c2. So for any t2 ∈ [0, Q2 − c2], the integral of
the densities of µ¯+ α¯ is nonnegative in each horizontal line, and thus
(µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0.
Let c1 + t1 < s2(c2). When c2 + t2 ∈ [s−12 (c1 + t1), Q2], we have
(µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, t2)) = (µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, Q2 − c2))
+ (µ¯ + α¯)([c1 + t1, c1 + b1]× [c2 + t2, Q2]) ≥ 0
where the last inequality occurs because the integral of the densities
of (µ¯ + α¯) is nonnegative in each horizontal line for z2 ∈ [c2 + t2, Q2].
When t2 ∈ ((p∗ − t1)+, s−12 (c1 + t1)− c2), the integral of the densities
of µ¯+ α¯ is nonpositive in each horizontal line for z2 ≤ c2+ t2, and thus
(µ¯+α¯)(X(t1, t2)) = (µ¯+α¯)(X(t1, (p
∗−t1)+))−(a negative number) ≥ 0.
• Consider t1+t2 > p∗ and t1 ≤ P1−c1. When c2+t2 ∈ [s1(c1+t1), c2+
b2], we have
(µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, t2)) = (µ¯ + α¯)(X(P1 − c1, t2))
+ (µ¯+ α¯)([c1 + t1, P1]× [c2 + t2, c2 + b2]) ≥ 0
where the last inequality occurs because the integral of the densities
of (µ¯ + α¯) is nonnegative in each vertical line for z1 ∈ [c1 + t1, P1].
When t2 ∈ ((p∗− t1)+, s1(c1+ t1)− c2), the integral of the densities of
µ¯+ α¯ is nonpositive in each vertical line for z1 ≤ c1 + t1, and thus
(µ¯+α¯)(X(t1, t2)) = (µ¯+α¯)(X((p
∗−t2)+, t2))−(a negative number) ≥ 0.
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We have thus shown that (µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for every ti ∈ [0, bi].
We use this to show that µ¯W + α¯ 1 0. We first note that µ¯W + α¯ 1 0
holds if (µ¯W + α¯)(X ′) ≥ 0 for every increasing set X ′ [38, Chap. 6]. So
we now show that if (µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds for every ti ∈ [0, bi], then
(µ¯+ α¯)W (X ′) ≥ 0 also holds for every increasing set X ′.
Consider the increasing set X ′ in Figure A.31. We construct X ⊇ X ′
such that the boundaries consist of lines parallel to the axes z1 and z2.
Observe that such a construction is possible for any increasing X ′. The
measure µ¯ is negative at the interior, and thus we have (µ¯W + α¯)(X ′) ≥
(µ¯W + α¯)(X). So (µ¯W + α¯)(X) ≥ 0⇒ (µ¯W + α¯)(X ′) ≥ 0.
Appendix B. Proofs from Section 5.2
Proof of Proposition 3: By Proposition 2, we know that β¯ cvx 0
if β¯(D˜(1)) =
∫
[c1,c1+p]
x β¯(dx, c2 + b2) = 0. We now find the conditions on
(pa1 , a1, p) for both of these equations to hold.
β¯(D˜(1)) =
2b2 − c2 − 3pa1
b1b2
pa1
a1
+
3a1
b1b2
p2a1
2a21
+
2b2
b1b2
(
p− pa1
a1
)
+
c1
b1b2
(b2 − pa1)
=
c1(b2 − pa1)
b1b2
− c2pa1
a1b1b2
− 3p
2
a1
2a1b1b2
+
2b2p
b1b2
= 0
⇒ p =
3p2a1
2a1
+
c2pa1
a1
− c1(b2 − pa1)
2b2
.
∫
[c1,c1+p]
(x− c1) β¯(dx, c2 + b2)
=
1
b1b2
(
(2b2 − c2 − 3pa1)
p2a1
2a21
+ a1
p3a1
a31
+ b2p
2 − b2
p2a1
a21
)
=
1
b1b2
(
b2p
2 − (c2 + pa1)
p2a1
2a21
)
= 0⇒ p = pa1
a1
√
(pa1 + c2)
2b2
.
Thus if the parameters (pa1 , p, a1) satisfy
p =
3p2a1/(2a1) + c2pa1/a1 − c1(b2 − pa1)
2b2
=
pa1
a1
√
pa1 + c2
2b2
,
then, β¯ satisfies β¯(D˜(1)) =
∫
[c1,c1+p]
x β¯(dx, c2 + b2) = 0. We also have∫
D˜(1) f dβ¯ = 0 for any affine function f(x) = β1x+ β2.
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Now, imposing µ¯(W ) = 0, we easily derive p = (b1 − c1)/2. We now
substitute p in (24), and obtain
a1 = pa1
(
3
2pa1 + c2
b1b2 − c1pa1
)
=
pa1
b1 − c1
√
2(pa1 + c2)
b2
.
Rearranging, squaring, and simplifying, we have the following cubic equation
in pa1 .
p3a1(2c
2
1) + p
2
a1(2c
2
1c2 − 4b1b2c1 − 9b2(b1 − c1)2/4)
+ pa1(2b
2
1b
2
2 − 4b1b2c1c2 − 3c2b2(b1 − c1)2) + 2b21b22c2 − c22b2(b1 − c1)2 = 0.
So if pa1 is a solution to (26), and a1 satisfies (25), then the conditions
β¯ cvx 0 and
∫
D˜(1) f dβ¯ = 0 for any affine f , are satisfied.
Proofs of Claims
1. We rearrange (24) as follows, to derive an expression for a1.
pa1
√
2b2(pa1 + c2) = 3p
2
a1/2 + c2pa1 − c1a1(b2 − pa1)
⇒ a1 =
p2a1/2 + pa1
(
c2 + pa1 −
√
2b2(c2 + pa1)
)
c1(b2 − pa1)
. (B.1)
Using the expression for a1, we write pa1/a1 as follows.
pa1
a1
=
c1(b2 − pa1)
pa1/2 + c2 + pa1 −
√
2b2(c2 + pa1)
(B.2)
Using the expression for pa1/a1, we write p as follows.
p =
pa1
a1
√
pa1 + c2
2b2
=
c1(b2 − pa1)
pa1
√
b2
2(c2+pa1)
+
√
2b2(c2 + pa1)− 2b2
. (B.3)
Substituting pa1 = b2 in (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3), we obtain a1 = ∞,
and pa1/a1 = p = 0.
2. Consider (B.1). The term
(
c2 + pa1 −
√
2b2(c2 + pa1)
)
, and its differ-
ential w.r.t. pa1 , are both nonnegative when pa1 ∈ [(2b2 − c2)+, b2].
So, as pa1 decreases from b2 to (2b2 − c2)+, the numerator decreases
and the denominator increases, resulting in an decrease of a1.
Consider (B.2). By the same reasoning as above, pa1/a1 increases as
pa1 decreases.
Consider (B.3). The differential of the term pa1
√
b2
2(c2+pa1)
w.r.t. pa1 ,
and the term
√
2b2(c2 + pa1)− 2b2, are both nonnegative when pa1 =
[(2b2 − c2)+, b2]. So, as pa1 decreases, the numerator increases and
the denominator decreases, resulting in an increase of p. Hence the
result.
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3. We just showed that p increases as pa1 decreases. So it suffices to prove
that pa1 = (2b2− c2)+ results in p ≥ (b1− c1)/2. We first consider the
case when 2b2 − c2 ≥ 0. At pa1 = 2b2 − c2, we have
a1 = (2b2 − c2)2/(2c1(c2 − b2)); pa1/a1 = p = 2c1(c2 − b2)/(2b2 − c2).
We now show that 2c1
c2−b2
2b2−c2 ≥ b1−c12 is true. Rearranging, we get
c2(b1+3c1)−2b2(c1+b1) ≥ 0, which holds when c2 ≥ 2b2(b1+c1)/(b1+
3c1).
We now consider the case when 2b2−c2 ≤ 0. At pa1 = (2b2−c2)+ = 0,
we have
a1 = 0; pa1/a1 = c1b2/(c2 −
√
2b2c2); p = c1b2/(
√
2b2c2 − 2b2).
We now show that c1b2√
2b2c2−2b2 ≥
b1−c1
2 is true. Rearranging and squar-
ing on both sides, we get c2 ≤ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2, which holds by
the assumption in the claim. This proves that there exist a pa1 ∈
[(2b2 − c2)+, b2].
When pa1 ≥ (2b2 − c2)+, it is clear from (B.3) that pa1/a1 ≤ p.
4. We first split W into the following three regions:
W1 : [(c1 + b1)/2, c1 + b1)× {{c2} ∪ [c2 + 2b2/3, c2 + b2]},
W2 : [2(c1 + b1)/3, c1 + b1]× (c2, c2 + 2b2/3],
W3 : {[(c1 + b1)/2, 2(c1 + b1)/3] × (c2, c2 + 2b2/3]}
∪ {{c1 + b1} × [c2 + 2b2/3, c2 + b2]}. (B.4)
We now set up the (dual variable) γ measure as follows. First, let
γ1 := γ
Z
1 + γ
D\Z
1 , with γ
Z
1 = µ¯
Z , and γ
D\Z
1 = (µ¯
D\Z + β¯)+. So γ1 is
supported on (∂D+∪Z). Next we specify the transition kernel γ(· | z)
for z ∈ (∂D+ ∪ Z).
(a) For z ∈ Z, we define γ(· | z) = δz(·). We interpret this as the
mass being retained at each z ∈ Z.
(b) For z ∈ [c1, c1 + pa1/a1] × {c2 + b2}, γ(· | z) is defined by the
uniform probability density on the line {z1} × [s1(z1), c2 + b2),
and zero elsewhere. We interpret this as a transfer of (µs+βs)(z)
from the boundary to the above line when z1 ∈ (c1, c1 + pa1/a1),
and a transfer of βp(z) when z1 = c1.
(c) For z ∈ [c1 + pa1/a1, c1 + p] × {c2 + b2}, we define γ(x | z) =
µ(x)/(µs+βs)(z) when x ∈ {z1}×(c2, c2+b2), µs(x)/(µs+βs)(z)
when x = (z1, c2), and zero otherwise. We interpret this as a
transfer of (µs + βs)(z) from the boundary to the above line.
(d) For z ∈ W1 ∩ ∂D+, we define γ(x | z) = µ(x)/µs(z) when x =
{z1} × [c2 + 2b2/3, c2 + b2), µs(x)/µs(z) when x = (z1, c2), and
zero otherwise. Again, we interpret this as a transfer of µs(z)
from the boundary to the above line.
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(a) (b)
Figure B.32: The function s1(z1), when (a) pa1 reaches (2b2− c2) at a1 > 1 (b) a1 reaches
1 at pa1 > (2b2 − c2).
(e) For z ∈W2 ∩ ∂D+, γ(· | z) is defined by the uniform probability
density on the line [2(c1+b1)/3, c1+b1)×{z2}, and zero elsewhere.
Again, we interpret this as a transfer of µs(z) from the boundary
to the above line.
(f) For z ∈ W3 ∩ ∂D+, γ(· | z) is defined as follows. The total
mass µs(W3 ∩ ∂D+) is spread uniformly on W3\∂D+ with equal
contribution from each z in W3 ∩ ∂D+.
We then define γ(F ) =
∫
(z,z′)∈F γ1(dz)γ(dz
′ | z) for any measurable
F ∈ D × D. It is then easy to check, by virtue of the choices of
s1(z1), Z, and the matchings in (a)–(f), that γ
Z
2 = γ(Z, ·) = µ¯Z ,
and γ
D\Z
2 = γ(D\Z, ·) = (µ¯D\Z + β¯)−. Thus (γ1 − γ2)Z = 0 and
(γ1 − γ2)D\Z = µ¯D\Z + β¯.
We now define the allocation q(z) to be
q(z) =


(0, 0) if z ∈ Z
(a1, 1) if z ∈ A
(1, 1) if z ∈W
The primal variable u(z) can be derived from this, since ∇u = q.
Verifying if u and γ satisfy all the required constraints is now similar to
the verifications in the proof of Proposition 1. The optimal mechanism
thus is as in Figure 8a.
Proof of Claim 5, Section 5.2:
Consider the case where a1 > 1 when p = (b1 − c1)/2. Then starting
from the pa1 that led to p = (b1 − c1)/2, we continue to decrease pa1 , and
56
modify a1 and p according to (24). We stop either when pa1 reaches 2b2− c2
or when a1 reaches 1. We thus have two cases.
Case a: pa1 reaches (2b2 − c2) at a1 > 1
In this case, we have pa1/a1 = p = 2c1(c2 − b2)/(2b2 − c2). Observe that
the structure is then the same as depicted in Figure 6b, with P2 = c2. We
now decrease pa1 until pa1 = p
∗
a1 , but modify the point P according to (17),
i.e., we use α¯(1) as the shuffling measure. The structure is now the same
as depicted in Figure 8b. We fix P and s1(z1) corresponding to pa1 = p
∗
a1 ,
and decrease p until p = p∗. Observe that the procedure is similar to the
procedure adopted in the proof of claim in Case 4, Section 5.1.
Figure B.32a shows the structure in Figure 8b with P and s1(z1) cor-
responding to p∗a1 . Observe that P1 constructed thus, may be more than
c1 + b1. We get around this issue by ignoring P for time being, continue
decreasing pa1 until it reaches p
∗
a1 , and then further decrease p to p
∗. We fix
P and s1(z1) corresponding to the pa1 for which P1 = c1+b1. We claim that
the value of p∗ so obtained is at most b1. This can be observed as follows.
p∗ equals b1 when c1 + c2 = b2 − (3/2)b1. Also, p∗ decreases with increase
in (c1 + c2). So p
∗ ≤ b1 if c1 + c2 ≥ b2 − (3/2)b1. But from the theorem
statement, we have c2 ≥ b2. So p∗ ≤ b1 holds.
We now argue that the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 8b. We do
so by fixing θ = µ¯W+ + α¯
(1), and showing that this value of θ satisfies the
assumptions in Lemma 2. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 2 only involve
verifying α¯(1) cvx 0 and
∫
D ‖x‖1 dα¯(1) ≥ 0, both of which are established
in Proposition 2. The following lemma proves that θ satisfies condition (i).
Lemma 4. Consider the structure in Figure 8b. Let s1(z1) associated with
µ¯+ α¯(1) satisfy s1(z1) > max(c2, c1+ c2+p
∗−z1) for every z1 ∈ [c1, c1+ b1).
Further, let c2 ≥ b2. Then, the following hold:
(a) (µ¯+ α¯(1))(W ∩{z1 ≥ c1+ t1}∩{z2 ≥ c2+ t2}) ≥ 0 for every ti ∈ [0, bi].
(b) θ − µ¯W− = µ¯W + α¯(1) 1 0.
Proof. Recall that X(t1, t2) = W ∩ {z1 ≥ t1 + c1, z2 ≥ t2 + c2} from the
proof of Lemma 3. So we must prove that (µ¯+ α¯(1))(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for every
ti ∈ [0, bi]. We start with t1 = 0. Observe that the set X(0, t2) = W\{z2 <
c2 + t2}. We now prove that (µ¯ + α¯(1))W ({z2 < c2 + t2}) = µ¯W ({z2 <
c2 + t2}) ≤ 0 holds for every t2 ∈ [0, b2], whenever c2 ≥ b2.
Let t2 ∈ [0, p∗]. Then, µ¯W ({z2 < c2 + t2}) = −c2(b1 − p∗) + t2(c1 −
2b1 + 3p
∗ − 3t2/2). We will show that maxt2∈[0,p∗](−c2(b1 − p∗) + t2(c1 −
2b1 + 3p
∗ − 3t2/2)) ≤ 0. We note that this proves the inequality for every
t2 ∈ [0, p∗]. The maximum is attained at t2 = t∗2 := (c1 − 2b1 + 3p∗)/3,
provided t∗2 ∈ [0, p∗]. Assume t∗2 ∈ [0, p∗]. Then,
µ¯W ({z2 < c2 + t∗2}) = −c2(b1 − p∗) + (c1 − 2b1 + 3p∗)2/6
= b1(b2 − c2 − 2p∗) + (2b1 − c1)2/6.
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The last equality uses 3(p∗)2/2+ p∗(c1 + c2)− b1b2 = 0. By our assumption
that t∗2 ≥ 0, we have p∗ ≥ (2b1− c1)/3. We also have c2 ≥ b2 by assumption
in the lemma. Using both of these inequalities, we have
b1(b2−c2−2p∗)+(2b1−c1)2/6 ≤ b1(b2−c2)−2b1(2b1−c1)/3+(2b1−c1)2/6 ≤ 0.
Now consider t∗2 /∈ [0, p∗]. Then the maximum of (−c2(b1 − p∗) + t2(c1 −
2b1 + 3p
∗ − 3t2/2)) is attained either at t2 = 0 or t2 = p. It is attained at
t2 = 0 if p
∗ < (2b1−c1)/3, and at t2 = p if c2 > 2b2. But µ¯W ({z2 < c2}) = 0,
and
µ¯W ({z2 < c2+p∗}) = −c2(b1−p∗)+p∗(c1−2b1+3p∗/2) = b1(b2−c2−2p∗) ≤ 0
where the last equality follows from 3(p∗)2/2 + p∗(c1 + c2) − b1b2 = 0, and
the last inequality follows from c2 ≥ b2. We have thus shown that µ¯W ({z2 <
c2 + t2}) ≤ 0 for every t2 ∈ [0, p∗].
Let t2 ∈ [p∗, b2]. Then, µ¯W ({z2 < c2 + t2}) = µ¯W ({z2 < c2 + p∗}) −
2b1(t2 − p∗) ≤ µ¯W ({z2 < c2 + p∗}) ≤ 0. So (µ¯ + α¯(1))(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds
when (t1, t2) ∈ (0, [0, b2]).
The steps for the remaining part of the proof is as follows.
• Prove that (µ¯ + α¯(1))(X(t1, 0)) ≥ 0 holds for any t1 ∈ [0, b1]. This is
exactly the same as the proof in Lemma 3.
• Prove that (µ¯ + α¯(1))(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for t1, t2 > 0. This is done by
considering three cases: t1 + t2 ≤ p∗, and {t1 + t2 > p∗, t1 ≥ P1 − c1}
and {t1 + t2 > p∗, t1 ≤ P1 − c1}. The proof proceeds in the same way
as the proof of Lemma 3, but with fewer cases.
• Prove that (µ¯W + α¯(1)) 1 0 holds when (µ¯ + α¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds
for all ti ∈ [0, bi]. This has been established in the proof of Lemma 3.
Remark 3. The steps of the proof indicate that µ¯(X(0, t2)) ≥ 0 holds for
all t2 ∈ [0, b2], if one of the following holds.
(a) p∗ ≤ (2b1 − c1)/3.
(b) b1(c2 − b2 + 2p∗)− ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6 ≥ 0.
An analogous statement is true for µ¯(X(t1, 0)) ≥ 0 to hold.
Case b: a1 reaches 1 at pa1 > (2b2 − c2)+
In this case, we have pa1 > (2b2 − c2)+, and thus pa1/a1 < p from (24).
Define pˆa1 as the value of pa1 for which a1 = 1 occurs. We fix the points
pˆa1 , pˆa1/a1(= pˆa1), and p that corresponds to a1 = 1, and then decrease pa1
until pa1 = p
∗. See Figure B.32b.
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Observe that p that corresponds to a1 = 1, may be more than b1. In
such a case, we fix pa1 and pa1/a1 at the point where p = b1. This value of
pa1 is more than pˆa1 , by Claim 2, Section 5.2. The following lemma shows
that in such a case, either p∗ ≤ pa1/a1 holds, or p∗ is such that µ¯W 1 0 is
true.
Lemma 5. Suppose c1 ≤ b1, and c2 ∈ [2b2(b1 + c1)/(b1 + 3c1), 2b2(b1/(b1 −
c1))
2]. Let pa1 and a1 be obtained by solving (24) for p = b1. Then, p
∗ is
such that µ¯W 1 0, whenever p∗ ≥ pa1/a1.
Proof. We know from Remark 3 that both µ¯(X(0, t2)) and µ¯(X(t1, 0)) ≥ 0
hold for any ti ∈ [0, bi], if ci, bi belong to the following set.
{((b2(c1 − b1 + 2p∗)− ((2b2 − c2)+)2/6 ≥ 0) ∪ (p∗ ≤ (2b2 − c2)/3))
∩ ((b1(c2 − b2 + 2p∗)− ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6 ≥ 0) ∪ (p∗ ≤ (2b1 − c1)/3))}
(B.5)
We now claim that µ¯W 1 0 holds for all those ci, bi. To prove our claim,
we first prove that µ¯(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for all t1, t2 > 0, and then point to
the proof of Lemma 3 that it is equivalent to µ¯W 1 0. We consider the
following cases.
• Let t1+t2 ≤ p∗. Then, X(t1, t2) contains a portion of the line z1+z2 =
c1 + c2 + p
∗. So we have,
µ¯(X(t1, t2)) = µ¯(X(t1, 0)) + µ¯(X(0, t2))− µ¯(W ) ≥ 0.
• Let t1 + t2 > p∗. Observe that the integral of densities of µ¯ on each
vertical line of X(t1, t2) is a constant, except on the lines z1 = c1 and
z1 = c1 + b1. If the constant is positive, then µ¯(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds
because it is just an integral of positive numbers. If the constant is
negative, then
µ¯(X(t1, t2)) = µ¯(X((p
∗ − t2)+, t2))− (a negative number) ≥ 0
Thus µ¯(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for all ti ∈ [0, bi], and from the proof of Lemma 3, we
have µ¯W 1 0. We have proved our claim.
We observe that the ci, bi in the statement of the lemma satisfy b1(c2 −
b2 + 2p
∗)− ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6 ≥ 0, if p∗ ≥ (2b1 − c1)/3. This is because every
c2 given in the lemma is at least b2, and thus we have
b1(c2 − b2 + 2p∗)− ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6
≥ b1(c2 − b2) + 2b1(2b1 − c1)/3− ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6 ≥ 0.
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So it suffices to prove that ci, bi in the statement of the lemma belong to the
set
{(b2(c1 − b1 + 2p∗)− ((2b2 − c2)+)2/6 ≥ 0) ∪ (p∗ ≤ (2b2 − c2)/3)}, (B.6)
whenever p∗ ≥ pa1/a1.
Consider c2 ≥ 2b2. Then, ci, bi satisfy (B.6) if p∗ ≥ (b1 − c1)/2. We now
prove that pa1/a1 ≥ (b1 − c1)/2 for all ci, bi given in the lemma. At p = b1,
we have pa1/a1 = b1
√
2b2/(pa1 + c2), from (24). So pa1/a1 ≥ (b1 − c1)/2
occurs iff pa1 + c2 ≤ 8b2(b1/(b1− c1))2. But c2 ≤ 2b2(b1/(b1− c1))2 holds by
the assumption in the lemma, and pa1 ≤ b2. So pa1/a1 ≥ (b1 − c1)/2 holds
for all ci, bi given in the lemma, and since p
∗ ≥ pa1/a1 by assumption in the
lemma, we have p∗ ≥ (b1 − c1)/2.
When c2 < 2b2, we have two cases. Consider b2 ≤ 2b1. At p = b1, we
have pa1/a1 = b1
√
2b2/(pa1 + c2), from (24). So pa1/a1 ≥ (b1−c1)/2+(2b2−
c2)
2/(12b2) occurs iff pa1 + c2 ≤ 2b2b21/((b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2))2.
But for the case under consideration, we have
2b2b
2
1(
b1−c1
2 +
(2b2−c2)2
12b2
)2 ≥ 2b2b21(
b1−c1
2 +
b2
12
)2 ≥ 2b2b21(
b1
2 +
b1
6
)2 ≥ 92b2
where the first inequality follows from c2 ≥ b2, and the second inequality
follows from b2 ≤ 2b1. But pa1 + c2 ≤ (9/2)b2 holds trivially, since c2 < 2b2.
So for this case, pa1 + c2 ≤ 2b2b21/((b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2))2 holds,
and hence pa1/a1 ≥ (b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2) holds as well. When
p∗ ≥ pa1/a1, we have p∗ ≥ (b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2), which implies
that ci, bi satisfy (B.6).
Consider b2 > 2b1. We know that ci, bi satisfy (B.6) if p
∗ ≤ (2b2− c2)/3.
So let p∗ > (2b2 − c2)/3. We now derive an equivalent condition for p∗ >
(2b2 − c2)/3.
(
√
(c1 + c2)2 + 6b1b2 − c1 − c2)/3 > (2b2 − c2)/3
⇔ (c1 + c2)2 + 6b1b2 > (2b2 + c1)2
⇔ 2b1b2/(2b2 + 2c1 + c2) > (2b2 − c2)/3.
At p = b1, we have pa1/a1 = b1
√
2b2/(pa1 + c2), from (24). So pa1/a1 ≥
(b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2) occurs iff pa1 + c2 ≤ 2b2b21/((b1 − c1)/2 +
(2b2 − c2)2/(12b2))2. But for the case under consideration, we have
2b2b
2
1(
b1−c1
2 +
(2b2−c2)2
12b2
)2 ≥ 2b2b21(
b1−c1
2 +
3b2b21
(2b2+2c1+c2)2
)2 ≥ 2b2b21(
b1
2 +
b21
3b2
)2 ≥ 92b2
where the first inequality follows from 2b1b2/(2b2+2c1+ c2) > (2b2− c2)/3,
the second inequality from (c1, c2) ≥ (0, b2), and the last inequality from
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b2 ≥ 2b1. But pa1 + c2 ≤ (9/2)b2 holds trivially, since c2 < 2b2. So for this
case, pa1 + c2 ≤ 2b2b21/((b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2))2 holds, and hence
pa1/a1 ≥ (b1 − c1)/2 + (2b2 − c2)2/(12b2) holds as well. When p∗ ≥ pa1/a1,
we have p∗ ≥ (b1−c1)/2+(2b2−c2)2/(12b2), which implies that ci, bi satisfy
(B.6).
We now argue that the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 8b. We fix
θ = µ¯W+ + β¯ in case p
∗ ≤ pa1/a1, or in case p corresponding to a1 = 1 is less
than b1. We fix θ = µ¯
W
+ in case p
∗ is such that µ¯W 1 0. We show that
both of these θ satisfy the assumptions in Lemma 2.
For θ = µ¯W+ , conditions (ii) and (iii) are trivially true, and condition
(i) is true because µ¯W 1 0. For θ = µ¯W+ + β¯, conditions (ii) and (iii) of
Lemma 2 only involve proving β¯ cvx 0 and
∫
D ‖x‖1 dβ¯ ≥ 0, both of which
are established in Proposition 3. The following lemma proves that θ satisfies
condition (i).
Lemma 6. Consider the structure in Figure 8b. Let s1(z1) associated with
µ¯ + β¯ satisfy s1(z1) > c1 + c2 + p
∗ − z1 for every z1 ∈ [c1, c1 + p]. Further,
let c2 ≥ b2. Then, the following hold:
(a) (µ¯+ β¯)(W ∩ {z1 ≥ c1 + t1} ∩ {z2 ≥ c2 + t2}) ≥ 0 for every ti ∈ [0, bi].
(b) θ − µ¯W− = µ¯W + β¯ 1 0.
The steps of the proof are as follows.
• Prove that (µ¯ + β¯)(X(0, t2)) ≥ 0 holds for any t2 ∈ [0, b2]. This has
been proved in Lemma 4.
• Prove that (µ¯ + β¯)(X(t1, 0)) ≥ 0 holds for any t1 ∈ [0, b1]. This
is similar to the proof in Lemma 3, where each vertical line has a
nonpositive integral of (µ¯+ β¯)W .
• Prove that (µ¯ + β¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 for t1, t2 > 0. This is done by
considering three cases: t1 + t2 ≤ p∗, {t1 + t2 > p∗, t1 ≥ p} and
{t1 + t2 > p∗, t1 ≤ p}. The proof proceeds in the same way as the
proof of Lemma 3, but with fewer cases.
• Prove that µ¯W + β¯ 1 0 holds when (µ¯ + β¯)(X(t1, t2)) ≥ 0 holds for
every ti ∈ [0, bi]. This is already established in the proof of Lemma 3.
This completes the proof of Claim 5, Section 5.2.
Proof of Claim 1: Substituting pa1 = 0 in (B.1), we have a1 = 0.
Similarly, substituting pa1 = 0 in (B.3), we have p = c1b2/(
√
2b2c2 − 2b2),
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and on substituting c2 = 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2, we have p = (b1 − c1)/2. We
have proved our claim.
Proof of Proposition 4: We first verify if β¯e(D˜
(1)) = 0.
β¯e(D˜
(1)) =
1
b1b2
(
c1b2 + (2b2 − c2)b1b2
c2
+ 2b2
(
b1 − c1
2
− b1b2
c2
))
= 0.
Thus we have
∫
D˜(1) u dβ¯e = uβ¯e(D˜
(1)) = 0 for any constant u. Now we verify
if
∫
[c1,(c1+b1)/2]
(x− c1) β¯e(dx, c2 + b2) ≥ 0.
∫
[c1,(c1+b1)/2]
(x− c1) β¯e(dx, c2 + b2)
=
1
b1b2
(
(2b2 − c2)(b1b2)
2
2c22
+ 2b2
(
(b1 − c1)2
8
− (b1b2)
2
2c22
))
≥ 0
where the last inequality occurs since c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2. The proof of
β¯e cvx 0 is now similar to the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 5: The function s1(z1) associated with µ¯+ β¯e gives
rise to the following partition of D:
Z = ([c1, c1 + b1b2/c2]× {c2}), A = ([c1, (c1 + b1)/2] × [c2, c2 + b2])\Z,
W = D\A\Z.
Observe that Z consists only of a portion of the bottom boundary of D. We
now construct the allocation function as follows.
q(z) =
{
(0, 1) if z ∈ Z ∪A
(1, 1) if z ∈W.
We have fixed q(·) = (0, 1) in the region Z instead of (0, 0). We now partition
W exactly as in (B.4), and construct the γ function the same way as we
constructed for Figure 8a. The γ so constructed is feasible because we have
(i) (γ1 − γ2)D\Z = µ¯D\Z + β¯e, and (ii) β¯e cvx 0 from Proposition 4.
The utility function u is a constant in the interval D˜(1) = [c1, (c1 +
b1)/2] × {c2 + b2} because q1 = 0. So we have
∫
D˜(1) u dβ¯e = uβ¯e(D˜
(1)) =
0. Thus the condition
∫
D u d(γ1 − γ2 − µ¯) = 0 is satisfied. The proof
that u(z) − u(z′) = ‖z − z′‖1 holds γ-a.e., is the same as in the proof of
Proposition 1. The optimal mechanism thus is as in Figure 10 for {c1 ≤
b1, c2 ≥ 2b2(b1/(b1 − c1))2}.
Proof of Theorem 8: We prove this theorem by fixing θ = µ¯W+ , and
showing that θ satisfies all the three conditions in Lemma 2. Conditions (ii)
and (iii) are trivially true. Condition (i) involves proving that µ¯W 1 0.
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From the proof of Lemma 5, we know that µ¯W 1 0 holds when ci, bi satisfy
(B.5). So it suffices to prove that ci ≥ bi satisfies (B.5).
Suppose p∗ ≥ (2b1 − c1)/3. Then we have
b1(c2 − b2 + 2p∗)− ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6
≥ b1(c2 − b2) + 2b1(2b1 − c1)/3 − ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6 ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from c2 ≥ b2. So when c2 ≥ b2, either
b1(c2 − b2 + 2p∗) − ((2b1 − c1)+)2/6 ≥ 0 or p∗ ≤ (2b2 − c2)/3 is satisfied.
Similarly when c1 ≥ b1, either b2(c1 − b1 + 2p∗) − ((2b2 − c2)+)2/6 ≥ 0 or
p∗ ≤ (2b2 − c2)/3 is satisfied.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 9
Given f1(z) = f2(z) = 2z/(c+ 1), z ∈ [c, c+ 1], we compute the compo-
nents of µ¯-measure as
µ(z1, z2) = −5f1(z1)f2(z2) when (z1, z2) ∈ [c, c + 1]2,
µs(c, z2) = − 2c
2
2c+ 1
f2(z2), µs(c+ 1, z2) =
2(c + 1)2
2c+ 1
f2(z2),
when z2 ∈ [c, c + 1],
µs(z1, c) = − 2c
2
2c+ 1
f1(z1), µs(z1, c+ 1) =
2(c + 1)2
2c+ 1
f1(z1),
when z1 ∈ [c, c + 1].
µp(c, c) = 1.
We note that 1− Fi(c+ zi) = ((c + 1)2 − (c+ zi)2)/(2c + 1).
Let c = 0. We now identify the canonical partition of D using the same
steps enumerated in Section 3.
(a) We compute the outer boundary functions si(zi) using (5), which is
given by si(zi) =
√
0.6 = 0.7746 for all zi ∈ [0, 1).
(b) We now compute the critical price p so that µ¯(Z) = 0. This is equiv-
alent to having µ¯(W ) = 0. From Figure 6a, we have µ¯(W ) = 0 iff
2(1 − F1(p) + 1− F2(p))− 5(1 − F2(p))(1− F1(p))
+ 5
∫ √0.6
p
∫ p+√0.6−z2
p
f1(z1)f2(z2) dz1 dz2 = 0.
Substituting the values of µs, f1, and f2, we arrive at −(5/6)p4 −
(10/3)
√
0.6p3 + 3p2 + 2
√
0.6p − 0.7 = 0. Solving this bi-quadratic
equation, we get p = 1.09597 to be the only solution that is greater
than
√
0.6.
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(c) The critical points P and Q are given by P = (0.32137, 0.7746) and
Q = (0.7746, 0.32137). We thus have the canonical partition of D\Z:
A = [0, 0.32137] × [0.7746, 1], B = [0.7746, 1] × [0, 0.32137],
W = D\(A ∪B ∪ Z).
So the structure is now as in Figure 6a, with pai =
√
0.6, ai = 0, and p =
1.09597. To prove that this is indeed the optimal mechanism, we construct
γ(·, ·) and q(·) as in the proof of Proposition 1. Verifying that γ and u satisfy
the primal constraints, dual constraints, and the conditions in Lemma 1, is
also the same as in proof of Proposition 1.
For c > 0, the outer boundary function si(zi) is not defined at zi = c. We
thus add the shuffling measure suggested in (31), which after substitution
of ∆ and f , becomes
αp(c, c+ 1) = 2c
2((c+ 1)2 − (c+ pa1)2)/(2c + 1)2
αs(z1, c+ 1) = 2z1(3(c + 1)
2 − 5(c + pa1 − a1(z1 − c))2)/(2c + 1)2,
z1 ∈ [c, P1].
We add the shuffling measure α¯ at the interval D˜(1). Also, we fix pa1 = pa2 ,
a1 = a2, P1 = Q2, and P2 = Q1, since the case we have considered is
symmetric (i.e., f1 = f2). So we add the same shuffling measure at the
interval D˜(2).
We now identify the canonical partition of D as follows: (a) Computing
the outer boundary function s1(z1), (ii) Imposing the constraint α¯ cvx
0, and (iii) Imposing the constraint µ¯(W ) = 0. While constructing the
canonical partition, we will use the fact that s1(z1) = s2(z2), pa1 = pa2 ,
a1 = a2, P1 = Q2, and P2 = Q1.
(a) The outer boundary function s1(z1) with respect to µ¯+ α¯ is computed
using (15), and are given by
s1(z1) =
{
c+ pa1 − a1(z1 − c) if z1 ∈ [c, P1]√
0.6(c+ 1) if z1 ∈ (P1, c+ 1]
(b) We now impose the constraint α¯ cvx 0. From Proposition 2, we know
that this constraint is satisfied if α¯([c1, P1] × {c2 + b2}) =
∫ P1
c (x −
c1) α¯(dx, c2 + b2) = 0. We now find the conditions for both of these
equations to hold.
2c2((c+1)2−(c+pa1)2)+
∫ P1
c
2z1(3(c+1)
2−5(c+pa1−a1(z1−c))2) dz1 = 0
(C.1)
∫ P1
c
2z1(z1 − c)(3(c + 1)2 − 5(c + pa1 − a1(z1 − c))2) dz1 = 0 (C.2)
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(c) We now impose the constraint µ¯(W ) = 0.
2
2(c + 1)2
(2c + 1)2
((c+ 1)2 − P 21 )− 5
(
(c+ 1)2 − P 21
2c+ 1
)2
+5
∫ c+pa1−a1(P1−c)
P1
∫ 2c+pa1+(P1−c)(1−a1)−z2
P1
f1(z1)f2(z2) dz1 dz2 = 0.
(C.3)
The parameters are found by solving (C.1), (C.2), and (C.3) simulta-
neously in (pa1 , a1, P1).
(d) For c=0.1, we get the solution as pa1 = 0.796151, a1 = 0.231984, and
P1 = c+0.264655 = 0.364655. We also have P2 = c+pa1−a1(P1−c) =
c+0.734755 = 0.834755, and the critical price p = P1+P2 = 1.19941.
The canonical partition of D is thus given by
Z = {(z1, z2) : z2 ≤ s1(z1)} ∩ {(z1, z2) : z1 ≤ s2(z2)}
∩ {(z1, z2) : z1 + z2 ≤ 2c+ p},
A = ([c1, P1]× [s1(z1), c2 + b2])\Z,
B = ([s2(z2), c1 + b1]× [c2, Q2])\Z,
W = D\(A ∪B ∪ Z).
The allocation and the payment functions (q(z), t(z)) are given by (6).
So for c = 0.1, the canonical partition results in the structure given in
Figure 6a. By constructing γ(·, ·) and q(·) the same way as in the proof of
Proposition 1, we prove that this is indeed the optimal mechanism.
One could verify that the structure of the optimal mechanism is the same
for c ∈ [0, 0.250116].
Appendix D. The Weak Duality Result
In this section, we explain the weak duality relation between (3) and (2).
Consider the primal problem
max
u(z)−u(z′)≤‖z−z′‖1
u cont, conv, inc
∫
D
u(z) dµ¯(z).
The problem can be rewritten as
max
(u cont, conv, inc)
min
γ≥0
∫
D
u(z) dµ¯(z)+
∫
D×D
(‖z−z′‖1−u(z)+u(z′)) dγ(z, z′).
This is because if u(z) − u(z′) > ‖z − z′‖1, then the minimizer can choose
γ to make the second integral −∞. Hence the maximizer would choose u
so that u(z) − u(z′) ≤ ‖z − z′‖1 for all z, z′ ∈ D. The quantity dγ(z, z′)
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can be viewed as the price (or price measure) for violating the constraint
u(z)− u(z′) ≤ ‖z − z′‖1.
The dual of this problem is
min
γ≥0
max
(u cont, conv, inc)
∫
D
u(z) dµ¯(z)+
∫
D×D
(‖z−z′‖1−u(z)+u(z′)) dγ(z, z′).
Defining γ1(z) =
∫
D γ(z, dz
′) and γ2(z′) =
∫
D γ(dz, z
′), we rewrite the dual
problem as
min
γ≥0
max
(u cont, conv, inc)
∫
D
u(z) d(µ¯(z)−(γ1(z)−γ2(z)))+
∫
D×D
‖z−z′‖1 dγ(z, z′).
We now claim that the problem above is the same as
min
γ:γ1−γ2cvxµ¯
∫
D×D
‖z − z′‖1 dγ(z, z′).
This is because if γ is such that γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯, then the maximizer can
choose u such that
∫
D u(z) d(µ¯(z)− (γ1(z)− γ2(z))) > 0, and thus drive the
first integral to ∞.
This weak duality result provides us with an understanding of how the
dual arises and why γ may be interpreted as prices for violating the primal
constraint.
Appendix E. An Alternate View on the Construction of Optimal
Mechanism
Consider the structure of the mechanism to be as depicted in Figure 6a.
Let the price for the menu items (a1, 1), (1, a2), and (1, 1) be given by ta1 ,
ta2 and t1. Then, the expected revenue generated from this mechanism, R,
is given by
R := t1 ·
∫
W
f(x) dx+ ta1 ·
∫
A
f(x) dx+ ta2 ·
∫
B
f(x) dx.
The parameters ta1 , ta2 , and t1 can be written using the parameters pa1 ,
pa2 , and p in Figure 6a as
ta1 = a1c1 + c2 + pa1 , ta2 = a2c2 + c1 + pa2 , t1 = c1 + c2 + p.
Similarly, the points P and Q can be rewritten using the price parameters
as
P =
(
t1 − ta1
1− a1 ,
ta1 − a1t1
1− a1
)
, Q =
(
ta2 − a2t1
1− a2 ,
t1 − a2ta2
1− a2
)
.
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Substituting these values in the expression of R, we get
R = t1
((
c1 + b1 − t1 − ta1
1− a1
)(
c2 + b2 − t1 − ta2
1− a2
)
−1
2
(
(1− a1)ta2 + (1− a2)ta1 − (1− a1a2)t1
(1− a1)(1 − a2)
)2)
+ ta1
((
c2 + b2 − ta1 − a1t1
1− a1
)(
t1 − ta1
1− a1 − c1
)
− a1
2
(
t1 − ta1
1− a1 − c1
)2)
+ ta2
((
c1 + b1 − ta2 − a2t1
1− a2
)(
t1 − ta2
1− a2 − c2
)
− a2
2
(
t1 − ta2
1− a2 − c2
)2)
.
(E.1)
Observe that the expression is not jointly concave in (a1, a2, ta1 , ta2 , t1). This
is evident from the presence of product terms such as (1− a2)ta1 , a1t1, and
(1− a1a2). First order conditions will then only ensure local optimality.
It turns out that the first order conditions to maximize R are exactly
the conditions derived using the dual approach. We now have the following
result.
Proposition 6. Consider the problem of maximizing R over the allocation
parameters (a1, a2), and the price parameters (ta1 , ta2 , t1). The first order
conditions turn out to be (18) and (19), with the parameters (pa1 , pa2) re-
placed by the respective allocation and price parameters used in this problem.
Remark 4. Note that the dual approach does provide a certificate for
global optimality, but the first order approach does not.
Proof. We know that the expression for the expected revenue is equal to∫
D u dµ¯, the objective function of the primal problem (2). We thus rewrite
R as
R =
∫
A
(a1z1+z2−ta1) µ¯(dz)+
∫
B
(z1+a2z2−ta2) µ¯(dz)+
∫
W
(z1+z2−t1) µ¯(dz).
Given that the mechanism is as in Figure 6a, the utility of the buyer is
given by u(z) = max(0, a1z1 + z2 − ta1 , z1 + a2z2 − ta2 , z1 + z2 − t1). The
valuations z ∈ A iff a1z1 + z2 − ta1 ≥ max(0, z1 + a2z2 − ta2 , z1 + z2 − t1).
Similarly, z belongs to the respective region Z, B, or W , iff the expression
relating to the allocation and price schedules of the region turns out to be
the maximum.
We now use the same steps in the proof of [29, Thm. 1], and obtain ∂R∂t1 =
µ¯(W ), ∂R∂ta1
= µ¯(A), ∂R∂ta2
= µ¯(B), ∂R∂a1 =
∫
A z1 µ¯(dz), and
∂R
∂a2
=
∫
B z2 µ¯(dz).
We now claim that µ¯(A) = −α¯(1)([c1, P1]× {c2 + b2}). Recall from (15)
that the outer boundary function s1(·) with respect to µ¯ + α¯(1) satisfies
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∫ c2+b2
s1(z1)
µ(z1, dz2) + (µs + α
(1)
s )(z1, c2 + b2) = 0 for all z1 ∈ (c1, P1], and∫ c2+b2
s1(c1)
µs(c1, dz2) + α
(1)
p (c1, c2 + b2) = 0. From Figure 6a, we have
µ¯(A) =
∫ P1
c1
(∫ c2+b2
s1(z1)
µ(z1, dz2) + µs(z1, c2 + b2)
)
+
∫ c2+b2
s1(z1)
µs(z1, dz2)
= −
∫ P1
c1
α(1)s (dz1, {c2 + b2})− α(1)p (c1, c2 + b2)
= −α¯(1)([c1, P1]× {c2 + b2})
which is what we claimed. By the same argument, we have
∫
A z1 µ¯(dz) =
− ∫[c1,P1] z1α¯(1)(dz1, c2 + b2). In a similar way, we can show that µ¯(B) =
−α¯(2)({c1+b1}×[c2, Q2]), and
∫
B z1 µ¯(dz) = −
∫
[c2,Q2]
z2α¯
(2)(c1+b1, dz2). By
Proposition 2, the conditions ∂R∂tai
= ∂R∂ai = 0 can be replaced by α¯
(i) cvx 0.
Thus the first order conditions to find the local maximum of R are as
follows: α¯(1) cvx 0, α¯(2) cvx 0, and µ¯(W ) = 0. In addition, we also impose
the condition P1+P2 = Q1+Q2, because the line separating the regions with
allocations (0, 0) and (1, 1) should be a line of slope −135◦ in order to have
a utility function u = ∇q. Observe that these are exactly the conditions
that we imposed in our original dual problem, to reduce it to solving (18)
and (19) simultaneously.
This shows that if the structure of the mechanism is given to be as
in Figure 6a, the first order conditions to find the local maximum of the
expected revenue is the same as the conditions we derived using the dual
method. This is not unexpected, because the method of constructing the
canonical partition in Section 3 was designed by Daskalakis et al. [16] for
optimal mechanisms that have the allocations and payments (q, t) defined
according to (6). We also expect the first order conditions to be the same
as those we have derived using the dual method, for all possible structures
of the mechanism.
In addition to the limitation that the first order conditions derived in the
proof of Proposition 6 can only guarantee local optimality, another limitation
is that the local optimality is specific to the structure in Figure 6a. Given
that there are more structures possible with at most 4 menu items (see
Figure 14) beyond the structures depicted in Figure 1, the computation of
best mechanisms for a given structure does not give a proof of its global
optimality over all structures.
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